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SUMMARY
The study presents an analysis of the role of science and technological (S&T) 
policies in natural resource-based economies, focusing on the cases of Chile and Finland. 
The exploitation of natural resources has been identified by several authors as a limited-
long-term factor that affects economic growth. Finland following a technology-intensive 
path has combined natural resource abundance (NRA) with high growth rates. On the 
other hand, Chile whose economy depends mainly on NRA industries such as mining and 
forestry has not attained the Finnish economic level in spite of the successful reforms 
undertaken during the last two decades. Using analytical tools I define the S&T 
contribution to national income per capita over the 1981-2000 period, and analyze the 
complementarity of the relationship between S&T expenditures and NRA in both 
countries. I explain the diverging S&T performances in lights of three factors: 




Natural resource abundance (NRA) has been at the center of an intensive and 
steady debate during the last decades. Is it a real “curse” deterring NRA countries from 
economic growth or a development catalyst once some conditions are fulfilled? Several 
examples may support both positions. Australia, Canada, the United States and the 
Scandinavian countries have been cited as successful cases of nations which have built 
their richness over NRA (De Ferranti, 2002). On the other hand, Latin America and 
Africa may be defined as counterexamples in which the absence of complementary 
factors such as a property rights system, education and learning capacity has deterred 
them from fruitful natural resources exploitation (Lane and Tornell, 1996; Deaton, 1999; 
Maloney, 2002).
The divergence of NRA-countries’ performances noted through the twentieth 
century may be emphasized by analyzing the cases of Chile and Finland. Since the mid-
nineteenth century, Chile has based its economy on the exploitation of natural resources 
with mining as its main economic activity. Such natural resources dependence is still a 
major feature of the Chilean economy as its current share of primary goods exports in 
total exports confirms (Eyzaguirre, 2005). On the other hand, at the turn of twentieth 
century, Finland was identified as an agricultural-based economy with a high dependence 
on Russia and Sweden (Blomstrom, 1991). At the time, the income per capita gap 
between the two countries was not significant, although Chile outperformed Finland 
during most part of the first half of the century (Maddison, 1995). However, such low 
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difference would be left behind. The adoption of several policies, regarding trade 
liberalization, innovation and learning capacity led to a significant modification of the 
Finnish productive structure transforming Finland into a competitive and knowledge-
based economy (Schienstock, 2005). Chile lagged behind regarding the implementation 
of such policy reform leading to the emergence of an increasing economic gap between 
both countries during the second half of the twentieth century as their current income per 
capita performances confirm1.
The thesis focuses on a comparative analysis for the cases of Chile and Finland 
regarding the role and effect of Science and Technology (S&T) policies on national 
economic growth. With that aim, I explore the economic development of both countries, 
presenting the factors mentioned in the literature as the major causes of the differing 
development paths of Chile and Finland. I devote special attention to comparing 
innovation performances using input and output indicators, especially those coming from 
the World Bank KAM Index2. In order to define the R&D contribution to economic 
growth, I use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard errors covering the 
1981-2000 period, expanding normal growth regression using explanatory variables 
regarding NRA and R&D. I test two hypotheses. Firstly, I suggest that R&D contribution 
to national income per capita has been higher in the case of Chile than Finland 
                                                
1 Chile GDP per capita-2005: $5,747 (2000 US$)
   Finland GDP per capita-2005: $25,591 (2000 US$)
World Development Indicators, The World Bank
2 The KAM was designed by the Knowledge for Development Program to proxy a country’s preparedness 
to compete in the knowledge economy using more then 80 structural and qualitative variables. The 
comparison is undertaken for a group of 128 countries, which includes most of the OECD economies and 
more than 90 developing countries (see Science, Technology and Innovation topic in World Bank website 
www.worldbank.org)
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(Hypothesis 1). Secondly, I predict that NRA has been a stronger complement of R&D in 
the case of Chile than Finland (Hypothesis 2). Stating both hypotheses takes into account 
previous work on the effect of R&D investment on economic growth suggesting that the 
returns to R&D in developing countries are above those of industrialized countries 
(Lederman and Maloney, 2003; Goal and Ram, 1994). Worth to note is that high and 
increasing levels of both R&D expenditures and human capital, solid institutions, a 
steady and fruitful public-private interaction, and the emergence of strong regional 
innovation systems are cited as key factors behind the technological Finnish success 
(Schienstock, 2005).
The thesis is organized as follows. In the remainder of the first chapter, I discuss 
previous works on NRA return to economic growth. The second chapter focuses on the 
historical economic development of the two countries. I looked for the major factors 
which have led Finland to outperform Chile nowadays, mainly import-substitution-
industrialization (ISI) policies, land reform and innovation capacity. In the third chapter, I 
present the analytical model used to undertake the empirical analysis. I discuss its results, 
focusing on three categories: institutionalization; education, and decentralization.
1.1 Natural Resource Abundance
Exploring the impact of NRA in economic growth the concept of Dutch Disease
has been set up. Coined as a term by The Economist in 19773 as a description of the 
decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands after the discovery of North Sea 
oil in 1970, its theory states that an increase in revenues from natural resources will de-
                                                
3 The Dutch Disease" (November 28, 1977). The Economist, pp. 82-83.
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industrialize a nation's economy by raising the exchange rate which makes the 
manufacturing sector less competitive. Developed by Corden and Neary (1982) the Dutch 
Disease model divides the economy in three categories: a non-traded sector (services), 
and two traded sectors, a booming or tradable natural resources sector (oil, gas, mining, 
crops), and a lagging or tradable non-resource sector (manufacturing). It states that the 
greater the NRA, the higher the demand for non-tradable goods, shifting away labor and 
capital from the manufacturing sector.
Following up the Dutch Disease statement, several authors have deepened the 
discussion. Matsuyama (1992) has provided a formal model of the “linkage approach”, 
exploring the role of agriculture productivity in economic development granting learning-
by-doing feature to the manufacturing sector. His model is characterized by two sectors: 
agriculture and manufacturing. He comes to the conclusion that forces that push the labor 
force away from manufacturing and toward agriculture lower the growth of the economy 
by reducing the learning-induced growth of manufacturing. Besides, he points out that 
trade liberalization in land-abundant economies may slow growth performance by leading 
to resource shift from manufacturing towards agriculture.
Sachs and Warner (1995) show that economies with a high ratio of natural 
resource exports over GDP in 1971, have lower growth rates over the 1971-1989 period. 
The trend holds even after controlling for important growth variables such as initial per 
capita income, trade policy, government efficiency, investment rates and other variables. 
Mainly, they state that 1-standard-deviation increase in natural resources exports as 
fraction of GDP would lead to 1 percent point per year slower rate of growth. However, it 
is worth noting that despite the negative relationship between NRA and economic growth 
5
the authors define as a mistake subsidizing or protecting non-resource-based sectors as a 
basic strategy for growth. In further studies, both scholars revisit the topic, reinforcing 
their prior conclusion by changing the base year to 1970 and by extending the dataset by 
one year to 1990 (Sachs and Warner, 1997), and by analyzing the role of geographical or 
climate variables and by answering whether there is a bias resulting from some other 
unobserved growth deterrent (Sachs and Warner, 2001).
Other studies support the Sachs and Warner NRA-negative relationship with 
growth performance. Gylfason et al. (1999) grants the fact that natural resource sectors 
create and need less human capital than other productive sectors, concluding that “an 
increase in either the share of the primary sector in the labor force or in the share of the 
primary exports on total exports from 5 to 30 percent from one country or period to 
another reduces per capita growth by about 0.5 per cent per year”.
What kind of factors can be behind the harming-growth feature of NRA stated by 
the authors so far mentioned? De Long and Williamson (1994) notes that when a natural 
resource has high transport costs, then its physical availability within the economy is 
essential for the introduction of a new industry or a new technology. He cites the case of 
coal and iron ore deposits as prerequisite for the development of indigenous steel 
industries in the late nineteenth century. Lane and Tornell (1996) hold an explanation 
based on a “feeding frenzy” which starts with a windfall coming from either an 
improvement of terms of trade or the discovery of a new natural resource source which 
leads to a strong rent-seeking competition among power groups ending up in an 
inefficient exhaustion of public goods.
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Stijns (2005) argues that once a natural resource boom starts out, developed 
countries are in better shape than less developed countries (LDC) to face the challenge of 
NRA exploitation due to the well-defined and well-functioning property rights systems 
ruling the latter which contrast sharply with the weak and dysfunctional LDC economic 
policies. He states that in the LDC case, a natural resource boom may lead to wasteful 
rent seeking process and possible rising inequality. Deaton (1999) cites as the main 
problems in the specific case of African countries the low quality of investment, low 
processing level of exports, high concentrated mineral ownership, and the absence of 
complementary factors, particularly education.
However, several authors have stated that NRA not necessarily is a deterrent of 
growth performance. The cases of Australia, Canada, USA and Scandinavian countries 
do not confirm the rule of the “natural resource curse”. In his long-run comparison of 
mineral-based and non-mineral based countries performances, Davis (1995) concludes 
that mineral-based countries outperform non-mineral countries. The negative effect of 
NRA pointed out by the authors already mentioned may be offset by other factors such as 
human capital and innovation capacity. De Gregorio and Bravo-Ortega (2005) argue that 
the negative effect of NRA on growth may be outweighed by high levels of human 
capital. Their results indicate that NRA reduces economic growth in countries with low 
levels of human capital. Even more, they note that human capital not only partially 
compensates for NRA negative effects but may more than offset them. They point to the 
case of Scandinavia as an example of how countries that are well-endowed with human 
capital may reach high growth rates through a simultaneous synergetic development of a 
natural resource industry and a high technology sector. 
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Maloney (2002) identifies barriers with deep historical roots to technological 
adoption and innovation as the causes of Latin America’s underperformance, mainly a 
deficient “learning capacity” which has been intensified in the postwar period by the 
implementation of import substitution policies. He notes that strengthening local human 
capital, reaching high literacy rates or promoting technical education, has reinforced the 
developed countries capacity to learn from what was happening abroad, accessing 
quickly to knowledge generated abroad, and, in the long run, establishing local clusters. 
Lederman and Maloney (2003) using a cross-country analysis show that NRA is 
positively correlated with growth, and that Research and Development (R&D) investment 
and NRA are strong complements: the returns to R&D rise with natural resources exports 
and vice-versa. De Ferranti et al. (2002) reinforce the assessment of NRA role according 
to endogenous capabilities, promoting engendering a high level of human capital and 
developing capacity for national learning and innovation.
Summing up, complementary factors may put NRA countries out of the “curse” 
path. NRA countries with high level of human capital, well-defined property rights 
systems, stable and homogenous economical-political system, and steady R&D 




CHILE’S AND FINLAND’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Chile and Finland have shared a common feature, NRA. Mining in the case of 
Chile, and agriculture and forestry in the case of Finland have been strategic engine 
growth and good examples of how NRA may set up industries with significant socio-
economic returns. However, despite their NRA, both countries have followed different 
economic paths with different outcomes. The current chapter aims to review the 
economic development of Chile and Finland in order to identify which have been the 
major factors which have shaped the diverging economic performances of both countries. 
The differences that will be discussed will not be explained by superficial, short-term 
variables, but by deep-seeded socio, economic, and political factors that have defined the 
principle characteristics of their economic performances. In order to identify the mayor 
factors which justify the divergence of the Chilean and Finnish economic performances, I 
base my analysis on prior works developed by several scholars regarding comparison 
analyses between Scandinavian and Latino American countries. 
Blomstron and Meller (1991) group the causes of the Scandinavia and Latin 
America divergent performances into six factors: natural resources and industrialization, 
trade and industrial policy, socio-political aspect and the role of the state, agrarian 
reform, education, and foreign technology and capital. Both Regions faced 
Industrialization using differing strategies. Whereas Scandinavian countries built their 
current productive structures promoting a steady upgrade of both manpower skills and 
mechanization processes involved in the exploitation of their natural resources wealth, 
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Latin American countries opt for an industrialization process mostly focused on non-
natural resources-based activities4. Such premise led the latter to ending up with 
productive structures similar to those of developed countries5 which were not only non-
affordable by the weak Latin American economies but postponed the value-added quest 
within natural resources industries. With regard to trade and industrial policy, Blomstrom 
and Meller (1991) point out that prior to the Great Depression, Latin America and 
Scandinavia were regions fairly open for trading. Nevertheless, the economical shock led 
them to diverging trade strategies. Whereas Scandinavia remained open, despite a short 
closing-period in Finland, Latin America decided to substitute their imports and to close 
their economies by targeting self-sufficiency as its main economical goal (Bravo-Ortega, 
1999). In addition, the fact that Latin American governments were directly involved in 
goods and services production reinforced the closeness of their national economies 
contrasting sharply with the role of infrastructure and social service suppliers, out of 
productive activities, of Scandinavian governments.
Blomstrom and Meller mention land reform as another cause of the diverging 
performances of Scandinavia and Latin America. According to them, land reforms in 
Scandinavia created “small and medium-sized, privately-owned farms” which led to 
more efficient land cultivation allowing not only a higher investment, but also an 
increasing innovation rate. By comparing both reforming processes, timing and political 
                                                
4 As natural resources industries were mostly owned by foreign investors, Latin American national 
authorities did not perceived them as economical tools under “national management” deterring them from 
being used for the national development goals achievement.
5 Blomstrom and Meller (1991) highlight the case of Ecuador which had almost as many car producers than 
the US in the 1960s.
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environment come along as key factors. Most of the Scandinavian countries had 
implemented land reforms during the first decades of the twentieth century, whereas in 
most of the Latin America countries it did not come until the 1960s or 1970s (Bravo-
Ortega, 1999). On the other hand, the lack of general political support in Latin America 
mainly due to ideological struggles contrasted drastically with the social consensus 
supporting land reforms in Scandinavia (Haavisto and Kokko, 1991).
Education and foreign technology are cited by Blomstrom and Meller as part of 
the pool of causes behind the Scandinavia and Latin America diverging performances. De 
Gregorio and Bravo-Ortega (2005) emphasize such rational by pointing to the 
Scandinavian achievement of high literacy rates early on the twentieth century, with 
Latin America lagging far behind at the time6. It is worth to note that such historical 
divergence has not been only limited to literacy but it has rather extended to primary, 
secondary, and tertiary enrollments leading to major differences in high-skills workers 
supply affecting the emergence of new industrial activities. In addition of human capital, 
the commonly innovation granted role of growth catalyst (Lederman and Saenz, 2005) 
may be confirmed by analyzing the Scandinavia-Latin America gap. Exploring the cases 
of Finland and Chile may help to illustrate such situation. Not citing any innovation-
development causality for such specific cases, it is worth to note that Finland has defined 
knowledge as the main engine of its economy affording it a new phase of development by 
                                                
6 Literacy rate 1870-1890
Chile : 30.3%
Finland : 89%
Chile from Engerman, Mariskal and Sokoloff (1997)
Finland from O’Rourke and Williamson (1995)
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means of higher levels of competitiveness (Schienstock, 2005). Jumping into the 
Knowledge Economy afforded Finland a significant shift of its productive structure 
leaving behind its natural resources dependence by replacing it with a high-tech focus 
(Dahlman et al, 2005). On the other hand, Chile has not undertaken a similar process yet. 
Its innovation indicators despite of being rank among the highest among developing 
countries are still far behind of Finland’s, situation which has led to identify its 
innovation capacity as one of the most important barrier of Chile’s development (The 
World Bank, 2003; OECD, 2005).
The chapter is organized in three sections. First, a brief overview regarding two 
economic indicators: a) income per capita measured as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita, and b) share of natural resources exports in total exports. The use of such 
indicators is aimed to show how diverging have been the Chilean and Finnish economic 
performances, and how primary goods dependency has evolved with regards to economic 
growth in both countries. Second, a descriptive section focused on the historical 
economic development of Chile and Finland covering the last decades of the nineteenth 
century and the twentieth century. Third, I display a section regarding the analysis of 
three of the causes of the diverging performances: import-substitution-industrialization, 
land reform and innovation capacity.
2.1 Income and Natural Resources
Nowadays, the gap between Chile and Finland regarding GDP per capita is 
significant. Whereas Chile had an income per capita of $5,747 in 2005, Finland had one 
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of $25,5917. Therefore, Finland quadruplicates Chile. However, the situation was 
radically different a hundred years ago. According to Maddison (1995), the dawn of the 
twentieth century found Chile and Finland with similar incomes per capita, with Chile 
outperforming Finland during most part of the first half of the century (see Figure 1). 
Even more, De Gregorio and Bravo-Ortega (2005) point out that Chile’s GDP grew at a 
rate of 2 percent between 1870 and 1913 whereas Finland did at 1.4 percent, so that 















Figure 1: GDP per capita 1900-1994
Source: Maddison (1995)
                                                
7 World Development Indicators, The World Bank (constant 2000 US$)
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Nevertheless, Chile’s outperformance did not hold along the twentieth century. 
After the World War II, Finland started a period of steady growth which led to an 
increasing income gap between the two countries. Such divergence has been 
accompanied by structural changes in the Finnish economy. As Graph 2 shows, Finland 
has reduced its share of natural resources exports in total exports from 30 percent during 
the earlier 1970s to 14 percent at the upper 1990s, whereas Chile has performed over 80 








1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Chile Finland
Figure 2: Natural Resources Exports/Total Exports 1970-2000
Source: United Nations Statistics Division
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE)
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At the same time, Finland’s share of high tech exports in manufactured exports 
has increased from 8 percent in 1990 to 21 percent in 2004, whereas Chile has performed 
under 5 percent all along the period8. In the case of Finland, the GDP per capita’s 
increasing trend is concurrent with both the decreasing pattern regarding the share of 
natural resource exports in total exports and the increasing behavior of the share of high 
tech exports in manufactured exports. In the case of Chile, such concurrency is not 
replicated. The much slower growth of Chile’s GDP per capita is concurrent with high 
levels of the share of natural resource exports in total exports and with a stagnant 
performance regarding high tech exports. Summing up, Finland’s better economic 
performance coincides with a significant change in its productive structure by replacing 
its older focus on primary goods production by a new one of high tech products 
commercialization. At the same time, the absence of change in Chile’s productive 
structure, reinforcing the historical natural resources dependency of its economy, 
coincides with a slower growth rate than Finland’s during the second half of the twentieth 
century.
2.2 Economic development review
2.2.1 Chile
In his 1880-1990 review of Chilean economic development, Meller (1991) 
divided his analysis in the three chronological sections: nitrate and copper; 
industrialization; and economic liberalization.
                                                
8 World Development Indicators, The World Bank
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2.2.1.1. Nitrate and Copper
According to Meller (1991), natural resources have always played an important 
role in Chilean economy. During the sixteenth century, gold and silver were major 
resources. During the eighteenth and the nineteenth century, wheat was important. 
However, since the second half of the nineteenth century, two resources have linked 
Chile to the world economy: nitrate and copper.
Located in the northern regions of Tarapaca and Antofagasta, nitrate mines 
afforded significant revenues for the Chilean economy, becoming the sector the most 
important source of foreign exchange and government revenues. According to Mamalakis 
(1976) from 1900 to 1930 more than 50 percent of total government revenues were 
financed out of nitrate exports which jumped from $6.3 million in 1880 to $70 million in 
1928, peaking at $96 million just before World War I, being the GDP share of nitrate 
exports about 25 percent between 1900 and 1920 (Meller, 1991). The nitrate boom led 
the sector to become a major employer by rising its labor force from 4,500 in 1886 to 
60,800 in 1925 and never falling below 43,000 during 1910-20 (Mamalakis, 1976). 
Cariola and Sunkel (1985) argue that the explosive growth of the nitrate activity was not 
only an “enclave” in the Chilean Northern regions but generated a significant answer 
from Chilean entrepreneurs by means of the emergence of a vast pool of supplying firms. 
Unfortunately, the development of synthetic nitrate and the Great Depression took the 
industry through a swift fall affecting hardly not only the sector itself and its related-
industries but the whole Chilean economy.
16
TABLE 1 Statistics US multinational copper companies in Chile 1945-1965




Chile Worldwide Chile Worldwide
1945-1950 35 195
1950-1955 19.0 9.0 115 344
1955-1960 25.9 9.5 168 519
1960-1965 14.8 4.8 82 422
Source Meller (1991)
Concurrently with the emergence of the nitrate industry major mining flows 
started out around another mineral: copper. In this case, Meller cites two major events 
which transformed the copper industry: 1) a increasing demand due to the new electricity 
industry and the expansion of the construction sector, and 2) the feasibility of obtaining 
profit gains from the large-scale exploitation of ore with low copper content due to a new 
technological innovation at the time. As in the nitrate, copper extraction was carried out 
by external agents: U.S. investors. In 1945, copper exports made up over 50 percent of 
total exports, and close to 60 percent between 1955 and 1959. In lights of the significant 
revenues obtained by US investors and their low investment rates regarding international 
averages (see Table 1), Chilean authorities started to question whether the goals of US 
firms met the development goals of Chile. Finally, as disagreement between U.S. 
companies and the Chilean government increased and local copper capacity emerged, the 
government decided to nationalize the copper mines, which resulted in the complete 
takeover of U.S. companies in 1971.
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2.2.1.2 Industrialization
Referred to as the “Industrialization Era”, the 1934-73 period was characterized 
by a profound transformation of the Chilean development pattern by jumping into an 
inward–oriented strategy leaving behind the outward-strategy promoted during the nitrate 
boom period (Eyzaguirre et al, 2005). Such phenomenon was an outcome of how violent 
the Great Depression shocked the Chilean economy9 -exports down by 90 percent and 
national income by half (Maloney, 1997)- stemming the questioning of the fruitless of 
having an economy depending on external factors and putting in motion populist forces 
whose challenging demand elicited a flow of social instability. Facing up a so dire 
economical fall, Chilean authorities decided to promote industrialization by making 
Import-Substitution-Industrialization (ISI) the focus of its development strategy. ISI 
policy implementation was carried out through enacting high tariff protection, special 
incentives for the manufacturing industry through low credit and special access to foreign 
exchange, and public investment in infrastructure targeted to complement industrial 
production. According to Velasco (1994) ISI presented two faces. On one hand, 
particularly during the 1930s an 1940s, the social alliances and distributional mechanisms 
related to it afforded some growth and industrialization, and most of it deterred Chile 
from being a locus of social struggles. In Velasco (1994, p.380) words “…they (ISI 
policies) also proved capable of ensuring a modicum of social mobility and preventing 
social pressures from boiling over. As a result, Chile was an island of stability from 
1930s to the late 1940s…”. Nevertheless, Velasco notes that as ISI implementation 
                                                
9 Velasco (1994) cited a League of Nations report identifying Chile as the hardest hit of any country
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advocated for excessive regulations, a tax system filled with special regimes and 
exception, and an increasing public spending, budget deficit and inflation did not take 
long to show up. Eyzaguirre et al (2005) point to the small size of the national market, the 
no integration of the Latin American markets, the lack of export incentives, and the 
continuing dependence on imported capital goods as factors that led to a stagnant 
economical phase. What were the ISI effects for Chilean national economy? Meller 
(1991) cites two both negatives: 1) the overall GDP performance was still considered 
unsatisfactory, as increases in domestic productivity were very low10; and 2) the economy 
had a relatively slow incorporation rate of modern technology into its productive sectors.
2.2.1.3 Chile’s Economic Liberalization
In the mid-1970s, the Chilean economy shifted from a strong state-controlled , 
and a closed economy to a free-market and a fully-liberalized economy. Once the 1973 
military coup, the Pinochet’s government opt for applying a radical change on the 
economic model ruling Chile at the time. The private sector was singled out as the new 
engine of the national economy, with an exclusive participation on the goods and services 
production, particularly on natural resources export activities. The task was undertaken 
through the elimination of price control and subsidies, and the liberalization of the 
finance and trade markets. As a result, the export share of GDP increased from 12 percent 
in the 1960s to more than 27 percent during the 1980s (Meller, 1991), and the budget 
deficit inherited from the Unidad Popular Administration was overcome. At a first 
                                                
10 GDP per capita grew at average yearly rate of 2.1 percent during the 1934-73 period (Eyzaguirre et al, 
2005)
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privatization round most of state-owned enterprises were sold, staying under public 
control just 43 firms far down of the more 500 hundred existing by the end of the Unidad 
Popular government in 1973 (Velasco, 1994). Nevertheless, according to Eyzaguirre et al 
(2005), a constant and sustainable growth was not achieved mainly due to an unsuitable 
macroeconomic management and to an insufficient regulation of the financial market. In 
addition, pursuing to minimize the role of the state led to a dire deterioration of the actual 
social conditions and of the physical and social infrastructure. Such failures, particularly 
the weak finance market regulations, elicited the 1975 and 1982 economical crises with 
GDP per capita falls of 13 and 15 percent respectively.
After the 1982 crisis both the macroeconomic management and financial market 
regulation failures were corrected, allowing a recovery of the national growth rate11 and 
steady improvement in the external accounts. According to Velasco (1994) the latter was 
the result of a combination of internal and external factors: the government reshaped the 
outward-oriented strategy aiming to restore economic growth through exports, specially 
through non-copper exports, and to continue servicing the external debt, unlike its Latin 
American neighbors whose rejection of paying their international loans led them to 
complex socio-economical situations. Nevertheless, despite its macroeconomic success, 
the persistence of the state role minimization still deterred Chile from having high levels 
of equity; social spending on education and health decreased, whereas unemployment and 
poverty grew (French Davis, 2003).
                                                
11 GDP per capita grew at an average yearly rate of 4.6 percent during the 1985-90 period (Maddison, 
1995)
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The advent of a democratic government represented a significant momentum to 
Chilean social development, mainly characterized by the implementation of new social 
programs that benefited Chile’s poorest population. As expected, by maintaining both the 
active role of the private sector and the set of institutions inherited from Pinochet’s 
government, the democratic administration did not modify the main orientation of the 
economic system. Chile succeed on achieving high growth rates by reaching an annual 
average rate of 7.7 percent during the 1990-97 period, and on reducing the rate of poverty 
falling from 45 percent in 1989 to 18 percent in 2003 (French Davis, 2003). However, the 
Asian crisis strongly affected the Chilean economy, its average growth rate declined to 
2.5 percent during the period 1998-2002. Despite a recovery during the subsequent 
period, several studies stated that lack of innovation would be a serious barrier to the 
future Chilean growth performance, deterring the country from technology creation and 
adaptation, and from the achievement of being a developed nation (The World Bank 
2003, OECD, 2005).
2.2.2 Finland
In their historical Finland’s economic development review, Haavisto and Kokko 
(1991), identify Finland as the poorest European country of middle nineteenth century. Its 
dominant economic activity at that time was agriculture, with farmers mainly focused on 
animal husbandry and dairy production. They remark the major role played by Russia as 
Finland trade partner which allowed a significant increase of the agro-activities, leading 
butter to be an important export product accounting for 20 percent of exports at the turn 
of the twentieth century. However, the economic situation turned down as small Finnish 
farmers could not follow the technology path due to its high costs at the time, being the 
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returns concentrated on the major landowners. Inequality increased pushed by a rising 
unemployment and a significant migration to rural areas.
Time was short to reach an explosive situation. The increasing discontent led to 
the emergence of a large rural proletariat which found its place under the umbrella of a 
more progressive political party: The Social Democrats. In 1916, Social Democrats took 
over the national government, fact followed quickly by an Independence Declaration 
promoted by right-wing parties with the support of Germany and Sweden, fearful not 
only of the progressive ideas of Social Democrats but specially of the spread of the 
Bolshevick Revolution. Finally, the polarization led to a Civil War which ended up with 
the right wing forces victory. Despite their victory, the right wing forces were aware of 
their weak political position, stemmed from unsolved socio-economic problems. Haavisto 
and Kokko states that such rational led them to institute two land reforms whose premises 
gave rise to a major change in rural population: tenant farmers almost disappeared, and 
the number of landless rural laborers decreased significantly.
With the end of The World War II (WWII), the question of whether Finland 
would catch up its Scandinavian neighbors came up in light of its decision of staying 
outside the Marshall Aid program, the burden of supplying war reparations to the Soviet 
Union, and the continuing strong support to agriculture, in addition to the destruction of 
large parts of the capital stock. According to Haavisto and Kokko several factors 
collaborated to turning down such pessimistic scenario, pushing Finland not only to catch 
up its neighbors but throwing it into the wealthiest countries league. First, an erosion of 
the rural bias ruling Finnish economy at the time came up. One of the outcomes of WWII 
for Finland was the loss of Karelia Region to the Soviet Union which represented 12 
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percent of total national territory at the time. In order to resettle Karelian refugees the 
Finnish opt to support agriculture activity through controlling prices and distribution. 
However, the farmer’s demand for higher prices and the urban worker demand for higher 
wages pushed the authorities to modify their initial strategy by enacting a subsidy system 
aimed to support farmer activities and constraints on consumer prices. Haavisto and 
Kokko note that as an outcome of such strategy the agriculture labor productivity growth 
remained under 3 percent per year during the 1946-60 period, whereas labor productivity 
in industry grew at a 5 percent yearly rate. Such phenomenon brought the government to 
prefer larger production unit and more efficient method of production in light of 
significant budget pressure due to high number of Finnish small farmer existing at the 
time. Concurrently, a strong migration phenomenon occurred. As long as mechanization 
was being promoted and increased among farmers, particularly since the late 1950s, the 
demand for rural labor decreased eliciting major flows of workers heading towards urban 
areas looking for better opportunities. Worth to note it is the significant amount of 
Finnish who migrated to Swedish: over 200,000 people mostly younger migrated to 
Sweden between 1960 and 1970 (Haavisto and Kokko, 1991).
The second key factor on the post-WWII Finnish economical rise was the 
implementation of an economic recovery program aimed to rebuild the productive 
capacity and infrastructure of Finland. Primarily driven by meeting the Soviet Union 
repairing demand and the resettlement of Karelian refugees, industrial capacity recovery 
received top priority. Haavisto and Kokko cite the development of the metal industry and 
the restoration of the power productivity capacity as major example of the achievement 
of economic recovery plan goals. In addition, a report by the European Regions Research 
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and Innovation Network (ERRIN, 2005) points out how nowadays strong export-oriented 
industries such as pulp and paper and basic chemicals throve at the time thanks to the 
heavy investment of the post-industrialization process. Thereby the GDP share of 
industry exceeded the share of the primary sector for the first time in 1949, moving away 
Finland’s economical structure from its prior rural bias.
In addition to the factors already mentioned, Finland’s strong postwar relationship 
with the Soviet Union also affected its economic development to a great extent. Because 
15 to 25 percent of its total exports went to the Soviet Union, Finland was the most 
important Soviet Western trading partner until the end of the 1960s and again in the 
1980s (Schienstock, 2005). The two countries, in 1948, signed the Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, a five-year agreement that ensured the exchange of 
goods that adhered to strict payment and price principles. Nevertheless, despite the 
dynamic trading relationship with the Soviet Union, Finland remained during the first 
post-WWII decade as closing economy. The liberalization of trade did not come up until 
1955 by starting to decrease gradually tariffs and by relaxing quotas fixation . Several 
trade agreements were signed leading Finland to reach European policy trade standards 
by 1960s. Such trade progress put Finland facing the challenge of export competitiveness. 
By the early 1980s, the export share of the value added in primary and secondary sectors 
represented 80 percent, up from 60 percent by the 1960s12. Haavisto and Kokko argue 
that at least until the late 1960s, Finland’s economy was mainly boosted by policies 
                                                
12 Haavisto and Kokko cite Hjerppe (1988)
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aiming to achieve growth, investment, and particularly the international competitiveness 
of its exports.
The question of increasing export and the whole economy competitiveness pushed 
key social actors in the business or the public sector to conclude that Finland should no 
longer base its economic development on cost efficiency but rather on knowledge and 
technology intensity (Schienstock, 2005). Leaving behind the resource-driven label of the 
early 1970s Finnish economy and replacing it by a knowledge-driven one came up as the 
key challenge to be answered in order to support Finnish companies struggling in an 
increasingly competitive global economy. To achieve such goal, Finland kicked off a 
long policy reform process aimed to provide the right incentives for achieving an 
increasing R&D investment rate. The strategic decision of defining innovation and 
knowledge as major development goals and of taking up of the OECD-Knowledge-based 
Society first and National Innovation System (NIS) later approaches as its own afforded a 
major change in the Finland’s productive structure. Such strategic decisions were 
accompanied by the creation of a pool of S&T institutions forming the backbone of a 
sound public counterpart able of strengthening the public-private interaction needed to 
face the challenge of a knowledge-driven economy. The Science Policy Council (SPC) 
created in 1963 put together public and private actors not only to discuss but to define the 
major targets of the S&T Finnish policy in light of productive and development 
challenges. Nevertheless, the S&T reforms were not restrained to just an increase on 
public expenditures or the creation of new public organizations. Education and 
decentralization were not left behind and important reforms aimed to increase the high 
skill workers supply and to promote a geographical homogenous development were 
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undertaken. Networks of technical universities and polytechnics were set up in the late 
1960s and early 1990s respectively, process which along with the creation of incubators 
and S&T parks targeted the creation of technological poles throughout the country.
As a result of the new Finnish economy orientation, knowledge-intensive goods 
production increased at much faster rates than any OECD country; just the share of high-
technology exports in total exports rose from 4 percent in the early 1980s to 11 percent in 
1990 (Lemola, 2003). It is worth to note that the Finland’s economy bases were so sound 
that even the early 1990s severe economic recession –characterized by a 10 percent 
decrease in GDP over the 1991-93 period, and unemployment rates of 20 percent- was 
overcome in a short length due to high export diversification capacity of the economy 
which had been forged during previous decades.
2.2.2.1 Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Cluster
An excelling point in Finland’s economic development has been the ICT cluster 
setting up. Such process was the outcome of an upgrading process feasible due to 
comprehensive investments in human capital and technology. Despite the fact that ICT 
cluster peaked on the 1990s, the development of the industry is explained on historical 
factors. In their Finnish ICT cluster review, Blomstrom et al (2002) point to a set of 
historical conditions. The Finnish telephone network was never monopolized by the state. 
Finland’s national telephone system was established in the late nineteenth century, period 
during which the country was ruled as a Grand Duchy under Russia. Finnish authorities 
were worried about increasing Russian influence, so that they decided to grant numerous 
licenses to private telephone operators as a barrier to a future initiative of Russian 
nationalization. Once Finland obtained its independence in 1917, a public telephone 
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operator was created, but private operator did not lose their licenses, in light of how 
difficult would have been to run the highly spread telephone system. Blomstron et al 
(2002) notes two important effect of the existence of several telephone operators on the 
development of the Finnish telecommunication market. First, competition brought about 
technological change. Operators were compelled to improve quality levels constantly, so 
that new and better products were introduced faster than in other countries. Second, the 
multi-operator market attracted several international actors such as Ericsson, ITT, and 
Siemens which set up manufacturing facilities, strengthening competition, and 
contributing to build new human capital and knowledge ICT capacities.
Three companies have been important for the historical ICT cluster development: 
Salora established in 1929 focusing on radio and television set production; the State 
Electric Works created in 1925 by the Ministry of Defense to produce strategic radio 
technology, and later on (1970) renamed Televa.; and the Finnish Cable Works
established in 1917 to produce cable, and which later would be one of the cornerstone of 
Nokia Corporation (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2001). The three firms increased Finnish ICT 
capabilities by participating in several public and private biddings. Blomstrom et al 
(2002) identifies the establishment of the Nordic Mobil Telephone (NMT) network as 
one of the main drivers of the Finnish ICT industry. NMT pushed telecom manufacturers 
to produce new and highly innovative products in order to meet both the consumer 
demand and the network product standards once the NMT was in operation in 1980. 
Several successful joint ventures among local producers were set up aimed to develop 
new equipments regarding terminals and telecom supporting systems. In addition, in the 
1980s Nokia decided to jump into a new market challenge: The Global System for 
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Mobile Communications (GSM) system. Such path was not easy. High R&D investment 
rates were needed and Nokia’s product structure at the time became an important 
barrier13 (Blomstrom et al, 2002). In addition, the early 1990s recession struck 
significantly Nokia’s operation. The number of employees was halved in three years 
between 1989 and 1992, and the company was put up for sale being just the Rubber and 
Paper Division sold, since the telecom-electronic division did not find a buyer. 
Nevertheless, in the middle of such a crisis the company started to reap the benefits of its 
prior investment on GSM technology development. The breakthrough of GSM 
technology in 1991, and new marketing strategies allowed Nokia’s recovery becoming 
one of the most important ICT actors worldwide. By the year 2000, Nokia had more than 
55,000 employees worldwide and its global market share in the mobile phone market was 
almost a third. Nokia’s stock market value increased from 1 billion dollars in 1990 to 230 
billion in 2000, representing 70 percent of the total capitalization at the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange (Blomstrom et al, 2002). The company accounted for Finland’s 70 percent of 
ICT exports, 45 percent of ICT production, and 30 percent of ICT employment (IMF, 
2001). With regard to technological contribution, Nokia R&D expenditures represents 
approximately 30 percent of national R&D investment, and most of its 21,000 employees 
are involved in R&D tasks (Blomstrom et al, 2002).
                                                
13 Mobile phones and telephones systems represented just 15 percent of Nokia’s turnover. Nokia’s 
preferred high-tech areas at the time were TV sets and information technology, whose market were 
saturated and generating losses
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2.3 Causes of diverging performances
2.3.1 Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI)
After the Great Depression, several countries, fearful of the vulnerability of 
international markets, decided to look for economic independence by promoting the 
emergence of industries aimed at local self-sufficiency. Chile and Finland were not the 
exceptions, closing their economies in an attempt to relinquish their international 
dependency. However, the end of WWII was the starting point of differing economic 
strategies. Whereas Chile emphasized an inward process, reducing its international trade 
activity considerably, Finland, after a short closing period, opened its economy.
In order to ascertain how significant was the impact of ISI in the case of Chile 
compared to Finland’s, I analyze the evolution of two variables: GDP per capita and 
economy openness. Taking into account the openness performances of both countries I 
divide the period 1930-99 in three chronological phases: a) 1930-44, involving the post-
Great Depression and WWII years, period characterized by the implementation of the 
first ISI policies in Chile, and the closing of both economies, b) 1945-75, involving the 
post-WWII years, period characterized by the implementation of trade liberalization 
policies in Finland and the strengthening of ISI in Chile, and c) 1975-94, period including 
the implementation of open trade liberalization policies in Chile and the early-1990s-


























































































Figure 3: Chile’s and Finland’s Openness
Source: Maloney (2002)
During the 1930-44 period, openness decreased in both countries, with Chile 
slightly outperforming Finland. However, Great Depression affected less Finland than 
Chile as its better GDP per capita performance shows: Finland took a shorter time than 
Chile to retrieve its pre-Great Depression GDP per capita, as well as its maximum 
negative change was lower than Chile’s14. GDP per capita grew at a higher rate in 
Finland than Chile: 1.57 percent in Finland whereas Chile did at 0.47 percent. During the 
1945-75 period, both countries differed significantly in their economic strategies: Chile 
opt for closing the economy and self-sufficiency whereas Finland implemented several 
                                                
14 Chile took 14 years to recover its 1929-GDP per capita (1943), whereas Finland did in 5 years (1934). 
The maximum negative change in GDP per capita relative to 1929 was 33 percent in the case of Chile and 
6.2 percent in the case of Finland. 
Author compilation from Maddison (1995)
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trade liberalization policies. As a result Chile’s openness stayed at lower level whereas 
Finland’s did at higher levels. Such performances were concurrent with their GDP per 
capita performances: Chile’s grew at an average of 0.42 percent, and Finland’s did at 
3.88 percent. Finally, during the 1975-94 period, Chile sharply increased its openness 
reaching similar levels than Finland at the early 1990s. Such increase coincided with high 
growth rates regarding GDP per capita: 2.93 percent in the Chilean case.
Openness and trade has been cited as important determinants of differences in 
either income or growth (Edwards, 1997). In that sense, ISI protectionism affected the 
dynamic of Chilean economy by reducing the incentives to innovate and to compete. As 
basic demands would be covered, asking for either higher levels of quality or new 
innovative products did not come to mind. ISI stemmed an inefficient industrial sector 
which did not generate high levels of employment and did not produce enough basic 
goods to meet consumers’ demand (Meller, 1991). Furthermore, the evolution of 
protectionism led Chile into an excessive bureaucracy regarding trade restrictions putting 
away entrepreneurship as one of the pillar of the economy, and bringing up having the 
right connection as the path to higher profits. Finally, ISI did not achieve to modify the 
productive structure of the economy which was still most concentrated on the production 
of one commodity: copper whose production was undertaken by local actors but needed a 
series of intermediate inputs and capital goods which were still imported due to the lack 
of capacity to produce them at the local level.
2.3.2 Land Reform
There is sound theoretic and empirical support which reinforces the fact that a 
one-time redistribution of assets can be associated with permanently higher levels of 
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growth (Aghion et al., 1999). Several cross-countries studies have demonstrated that 
inequality in the distribution of landownership is associated with lower subsequent 
growth. The cases of Japan, Taiwan, Korea, India, Philippines, South Africa, Brazil and 
Colombia are good examples of how land reforms have brought about poverty reduction 
processes characterized by high levels of efficiency (Deininger, 2000).
In the case of Finland, land reform was instituted in the 1920’s becoming not only 
a solution to a specific socio-political problem but also a catalyst to the economy, since 
the increase in the number of landowners led to an increase in competition, which 
compelled farmers to introduce techniques that improved their productivity and product 
quality. The reform empowered small Finnish farmers by granting them ownership and 
property rights, allowing the creation of a large number of small, medium-sized, 
privately-owned farms, which led to the more efficient and intensive cultivation of land. 
According with Haavisto and Kokko (1991) several facts led to confirm the socio-
economic return of the Finnish land reform. Firstly, the number of landless rural laborers 
decreased significantly and tenant farmers disappeared almost entirely in the rural 
population, replaced by independent farmers. Secondly, the number of farms with more 
than two hectares of arable land increased from 185,000 to 235,000 between 1920 and 
1940. Thirdly, the amount of arable land increased by about one-third during the same 
period, from 2,015 million hectares in 1920 to 2,631 million hectares in 1940. In order to 
fulfill this task, Finnish farmers started to explore new mechanics and technology, 
drawing initially on the talents of local craft-based production and later on the 
technological innovation of industrialization.
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Historically, land ownership was ruled by a “hacienda” system in Chile which 
stemmed a significant wealth concentration regarding agriculture profits. Such 
concentration led to lower levels of competitiveness and innovation damaging the 
agriculture productivity (Ortega, 1987). However, the land reform undertaken since the 
mid-twentieth century modified the structure of land ownership: the share of farmers 
owning properties smaller than 20 Basic Irrigated Hectares (BIH) increased from 22.4 
percent in 1965 to 46.9 percent in 1976, whereas the share of farmers owning properties 
larger than 80 BIH decreased from 55.3 percent in 1965 to 24.7 percent in 1976 (see 
Table 2). However, after taking power, Pinochet instituted a policy to return land to its 
original owners. Although nearly 35 percent of the land was redistributed (Jarvis, 1985), 
the new policy did not indicate a complete return to old agrarian structures since the 
expertise that had been gained through land reform did not disappear. Regarding 
technological development, Ortega (1987) points out that from 1950 on landowners 
benefited from several public incentives in order to modernize their methods of 
production. He highlights the major investments done under the Eduardo Frei’s 
Administration (1964-1970) aimed to improve the agricultural infrastructure and to 
promote the creation of agribusiness.
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TABLE 2 Distribution of Agricultural Properties by Size in Chile, 1965-1976
(Percent)
1965 1972 1976
< 5 BIH * 9.7 9.7 9.7
5-20 BIH 12.7 13.0 37.2
20-80 BIH 22.5 38.9 22.3
> 80 55.3 2.9 24.7
Source: Jarvis (1985)
*BIH = Basic irrigated hectare
The undertaken of Chile’s land reform present two main differences regarding 
Finland’s: timing and political environment. Chilean land reform occurred forty years 
later than Finland’s postponing any efficiency gain coming from more size-homogenous 
distribution of land ownership.. Nevertheless, political situation which led to the land 
reform in Finland at the early 1920s was quit different than Chile’s. Finland’s land 
reform was undertaken under the leadership of the Conservative and Agrarian parties, 
which represented most of the richest landowners. However, despite its cost to their most 
important contributors, both parties decided to implement land reform to avert the threat 
of social revolution at the time, successfully cutting off the source of a long-term conflict 
that had to be prevented in the future.
In the case of Chile, the land reform implementation was postponed by the lack of 
political will to undertake it. Most of the traditional parties that ruled Chile during the 
first half of the century were headed by leaders which electoral bases were strongly 
related to the Hacienda system whose structure allowed them to drawn on at will of a 
significant amount of voters, particularly carrying peasants to the voting sites. Even the 
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Radical Governments of Aguirre Cerda and Rios (1938-46) identified as progressive and 
social-oriented administrations were reluctant to push a land reform in light of how 
threatening it could be for their support. Decades later, administrations such as Frei’s 
(1964-70) and Allende’s (1970-73) whose welfare bases were not so strongly dependant 
on the Hacienda system were the ones which implemented it, although at different paces 
and using different tools. Nevertheless, it is worth to note that the excessive polarization 
at the early 1970s transformed the implementation of the land reform in a political 
struggle which diverted it from its original goals, and generated a significant reluctance to 
accept it from one part of the Chilean society.
2.3.3 Innovation capacity
I use several R&D indicators in order to compare both countries performances. 
First, regarding S&T expenditures, Chile and Finland have followed increasing trend 
during the last decades either on absolute or per capita terms (see Figure 4). Nevertheless, 
their performances differ significantly. Finland total expenditures have been at least nine-
fold larger than Chile’s for each year of the covered period. One might thinks that such 
difference might be limited to absolute comparison, therefore taking into account a per 
capita base might lead to a different conclusion. However, the results are worst. Chile’s 
per capita rate is at least 26-fold smaller than Finland’s, with the gap increasing its value 
during the last years. In 2002, Chile spent 29 dollars per capita in R&D activities whereas 
Finland did it at 1,447 dollars per capita rate.
The most commonly used indicator fro international comparison purposes is the 
ratio of on expenditures on R&D to GDP. As Figure 5 shows the difference remains. 


































Figure 5: Share of R&D Expenditures in GDP
Source: CONICYT
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whereas Chile just 0.55 percent. It is worth to note the increasing gap among both 
performances since the early 1990s. As long as Finland consolidated its NIS approach 
adoption, its R&D expenditures significantly increased reaching a 3.48 percent rate in 
2003, far from Chile’s low 0.67 percent.
With regard to structure of R&D expenditure by funding source, in 2004 53 
percent of Chile’s R&D is funded by the public sector, whereas 37 percent is allocated by 
industry. Finland presents a differing performance with 70.8 and 25.5 percent of R&D 


































Figure 7: Finland-R&D expenditures by financing sector
Source: EUROSTAT
By continuing analyzing R&D input indicators, the gap existing among both 
countries not only remains but also expands. With regard to S&T Human Capital, Finland 
doubled Chile at the early 1980s on number of researchers by having 8,837, whereas 
Chile had just 3,283. Extending the analysis to per million inhabitant terms, the 
difference is just expanded with Finland outperforming Chile by more than six times. In 
the next decades the gap increased reaching in 2001 a significant difference between both 
performances: whereas Chile reached 498 researchers per million inhabitants, Finland 



























Figure 8: Number of researcher per million inhabitants
Source: RICYT, OECD Main S&T Indicators
With regard to output indicators the Finland-outperforming-Chile trend does not 
change. Finland’s researchers have been significantly most productive in publishing, 
experiencing a noticeable took off since the early 1990s. The gap among the two 
countries has done nothing but increasing during the last two decades being Finland 
publishing productivity ten times larger than Chile’s in 2004 (see Figure 9). On the other 
hand, the performances are much more diverging regarding patent productivity (see 
Figure 10). Several scholars have pointed Chile’s low applied research activity as a proof 
of its low innovative capacity (CNIC-B, 2006). Finland outperforms Chile, and the gap 
among both increases throughout the period considered. It is worth to note the stagnant 









































Figure 10:Number of patents per million inhabitants
Source: USPTO
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In order to strengthen the innovation-capacity-comparative analysis I present the 
World Bank Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM)15 indicators, and display a 
description of each National Innovation System.
2.3.3.1 KAM Index
KAM considers in its analysis four main topics as pillar of the country knowledge 
performance: economic and institutional regime, education and training, innovation 
system, and information and communication technology, and provides index values 
regarding each category. Table 3 presents all the pillars regarding each indicator involved 
in.
Economic and Institutional Regime is the only area in which Chile’s 
performance overcomes Finland’s. It is worth to note that Chile ranks third at the world 
level (8.96 points) just behind Singapore and Hong Kong. The reasons of the Chilean 
outstanding performance are based on the quality and probity of its institutions and on its 
trade liberalization strategy. Finland ranks high on the ranking as well filling the fifth 
position 8.78 (points). 
With regard of the Education and Training’s pillar there is significant divergence. 
Whereas Finland leads the rank, Chile ranks at the 46th position. Both countries present 
high enrollment rates at the primary and secondary level but a significant gap comes up at 
the tertiary level. Regarding Innovation System Finland significantly outperforms Chile.
                                                
15 The KAM was designed by the Knowledge for Development Program to proxy a country’s preparedness 
to compete in the knowledge economy using more then 80 structural and qualitative variables. The 
comparison is undertaken for a group of 128 countries, which includes most of the OECD economies and 
more than 90 developing countries (see Science, Technology and Innovation topic in World Bank website 
www.worldbank.org)
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TABLE 3 KAM Indicators
Economic and Institutional Regime CHILE FINLAND














Rule of Law 1.16 (85.5%) 1.97 (98.6%)
EIR index 8.96 (3) 8.78 (5)
Education and Training
Adult literacy rate 95.6% 100%
Primary education enrollment 99.2% 101.7%
Secondary education enrollment 87.8% 127.4%
Tertiary education enrollment 43.2% 86.9%
ET index 6.24 (46) 9.21 (1)
Innovation System
Expenditures (2002)
-%GDP in S&T 0.68% 3.46%
-S&T expenditures per capita 26 1,147
-% of S&T expenditures-Public 54.64% 25.5%
-% of S&T expenditures-Private 33.25% 70.8%
Human Resources (2003)
-Number of researchers 8,658 41,724
-Researcher per million 549 8,003
Productivity (most recent)
-Scientific journal articles per million 78.11 982.65
-USPTO patent applications per million 1.13 182.76
-University industry collaboration 3.70 6.10
Innovation System Index 5.72(48) 9.73(1)
Information and Communication Technology
Telephones per 1,000 people 836.10 1,410.30
Computers per 1,000 people 138.70 482.20
Internet users per 10,000 people 2,790.20 6,299.85
ICT Index 6.51(45) 8.71(17)
Source: KAM, World Bank
                                                
16 The number in parenthesis refers the rank of each country
17 The number in parenthesis refers the percentile rank which indicates the percentage of countries 
worldwide that rate below the selected country
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Whereas Finland ranks first, Chile fills the 48th position. The differences are 
astonished across input and output indicators. The Finland’s share of S&T expenditures 
in GDP is five times higher than Chile’s just as the number of researcher’s. It is worth to 
note the S&T expenditures are mainly funded by the private sector in Finland; quite the 
contrary is the situation in Chile where the main S&T funding agent is the public sector. 
Jumping to output indicators the gap widens. The Finnish production of scientific article 
is ten times higher than Chile’s, whereas United States Trademark and Patent Office 
(USTPO) patent applications registers are one hundred times higher in Finland than 
Chile. The gap is confirmed regarding the Information and Communication Technology’s 
pillar: Finland occupies the 17th position whereas Chile the 45th.
2.3.3.2 National Innovation Systems
NIS has received several definitions: Freeman (1987) defined NIS as “... the 
network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions 
initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies”; Lundvall (1992) as “… the 
elements and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and 
economically useful, knowledge … and are either located within or rooted inside the 
borders of a nation state.”; Nelson’s definition (1993) was “… a set of institutions whose 
interactions determine the innovative performance … of national firms”. However, there 
are several basic concepts which are common to all NIS definitions: systemic approach, 




Public, private, academic and social agents such as public agencies and research 
centers, firms, and universities, are part of Chile’s NIS. In order to describe the Chile’s 
NIS actors I follow down the National Council of Innovation for Competitiveness 
(CNIC) Background Report analysis presented to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) which breaks Chile’s NIS agents in three 
categories: Public Administration, Innovation Public Funds, and Performers (see Figure 
11).
-Public Administration
According to CNIC-A (2006), Chile has not had a formal public institutionality 
centralizing not only the S&T decisionmaking but the definition of a national strategy 
setting the orientations of the policymaking process. Chilean S&T goals have been 
defined through a decentralized pattern pushed by the action of a pool of public agencies 
such as the National Development Corporation (CORFO) in the Ministry of Economy 
(MINECOM), the National Commission of Science and Technology (CONICYT) in the 
Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) and Agrarian Innovation Fund (FIA) in the Ministry 
of Agriculture, the Ministry of Health (MINSALUD), and the Ministry of Planning and 
Cooperation (MIDEPLAN) through the Millennium Scientific Initiative (ICM).
44
CNIC
National Council of 
Innovation for 
Competitiveness
Minister of Economy – CORFO
Minister of Education – CONICYT
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Planning
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
INNOVATION PUBLIC FUNDS
CORFO: Innova Chile, Innova Bio Bio
























 Private Chilean 
firms





Figure 11 Chile’s National Innovation System
Source: CNIC (2006)
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In addition, MINECOM and CONICYT have undertaken since the advent of the 
democratic government (1990) four S&T National Programs: Science and Technology 
Program (PCT) 1992-1995, Technological Innovation Program 1996-00 (PIT), and 
Program of Development and Technological Innovation 2001-06 (PDIT), Science and 
Technology Bicentenary Program (PBCT) 2003-10 launched in 2003 by CONICYT. The 
four of them have been aimed to achieve an increasing national innovative capacity by 
setting goals whose definitions have followed a discussion involving actors across 
society. Nevertheless, the lack of a formal global S&T institutionality is being currently 
faced the Chilean authorities. In 2005, President Ricardo Lagos sent to Congress a new 
bill proposing the creation of a new Council, CNIC, and a new technological fund, the 
National Fund of Innovation and Competitiveness (FNIC). The CNIC creation approval 
would involve setting a new Presidential Advisory Group aimed to coordinate the pool of 
organizations participating currently in the Chile’s NIS. The CNIC scope would cover 
issues related with innovation policy including the fields of basic and applied science; 
technology development, transfer, and diffusion; and human capital. According to CNIC-
A (2006), following such path, Chile would achieve the goal of having a sound, 
conductive, and integral, S&T public administration.
-Innovation Public Funds
The most important agencies in charge of the S&T allocation funds are 
CONICYT and CORFO. The former created in 1967 is focused on the S&T research 
promotion and strengthen, on the high skill human resources training, and on the 
development of new areas of knowledge and of productive innovation; whereas the 
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latter’s role is concentrated on the firm’s technological areas, transfer and diffusion of 
technology, precompetitive innovation, entrepreneurship, and high tech investment 
attraction. Each agency manages its own set of programs aimed to achieve the 
organization’s goals. Among the CONICYT’s funds worth to highlight are the National 
Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (FONDECYT), the Fund for 
Fostering Scientific and Technological Research (FONDEF), the Fund for Advanced 
Research in Priority Areas and FONDAP, whereas in CORFO, Innova Chile has a central 
role. Next, brief descriptions of the funds mentioned so far are presented.
-FONDECYT: Created in 1981 its orientation points towards strengthen basic research 
across all the knowledge areas. According to CNIC-A (2006), the program has been well 
evaluated, standing out its excellence, transparency, and discipline coverage.
-FONDEF: Created in 1991, it points to achieve an increasing university-industry 
partnership. Mainly oriented to university applications, it presents as an essential 
requirement firms’ participation by asking for real economical private contribution in 
order to ensure that any funded proposal will be addressing an actual industry demand. 
However, despite the private contribution requirement FONDEF has not been able to 
arouse the desired industry participation level (CNIC-A, 2006).
-FONDAP: It points to strengthen research groups located at excellence center by 
funding particularly proposals coming from well-recognized institutions particularly 
those in possession of high quality scientific doctoral programs. Its goals may be 
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perceived as similar as those of FONDEF, although its main target is the creation of a 
national critical mass on S&T areas.
-INNOVA CHILE: Recently created, it focuses on the promotion of technological 
innovation at the firm level through product or process R&D, transfer, adoption 
absorption, and diffusion of technology. CNIC-A (2006) highlights the good assessment 
that the program has reached in terms of the firm-support services and tools that it offers.
-FIA: Its mission is promoting the agrarian innovation processes oriented to strengthen 
the local agricultural innovative activities.
-ICM: Created in 1999 with The World Bank’s support, ICM aims to create the so-called 
Scientific Institutes and Nucleus of Excellence in several disciplines. Nowadays, 3 
Institutes and 12 Nucleus are in operation. ICM has been well-evaluated particularly in 
terms of its international connection and its high respect for excellence.
Regarding the S&T funding, Benavente (2005) points out that the 226 million 
dollars S&T Chilean public budget may be broken down: 53.1 percent is associated with 
regular programs such as FONDECYT, FONDEF, and FDI; 16.9 percent is allocated to 
national technological institutes; 12.8 percent to graduate scholarship either in Chile or 
abroad; and 10.4 percent is allocated to minor activities. He states that adding the 200 
million dollars the State transfer yearly to universities and the 120 million dollars that 
Industry spends in S&T activities, the whole S&T national budget reaches 500 million 
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dollars representing roughly 0.6 percent of GDP. Table 4 presents a summary of the S&T 
Chilean programs ordered by public agency.
-Performers
This category includes all those organizations participating in the different phases 
of the innovation process: universities, research institutes, and productive firms. Within 
the University System there are several institutions part of the Chilean University Board 
of Presidents18 which steadily develop R&D. Among them those worth to highlight are: 
Universidad de Chile, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Universidad de 
Concepcion, Universidad de Santiago, Universidad Austral de Chile, Universidad de 
Talca, Universidad Técnica Federico Santa Maria, and Universidad Catolica de 
Valparaíso. In addition, the public sector has implemented a pool of public technological 
institutes focused on applied research, development, technology transfer, and drawing 
and managing natural resources datasets.
                                                
18 The Chilean University Board of Presidents was created in 1954 as an organization in charge of 
coordinating the national university activity. Currently is formed by 25 universities, six coming from the 
northern regions, five from the south center regions, five from the southern regions, and nine from the 
Valparaiso and Metropolitan Region.
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Graduate National Scholarship-CONICYT 5,882
Explora Program-CONICYT 1,390
Science for the Knowledge Economy Program 9,863
Astronomic Institute Isaac Newton 105
Institutional Development Fund 15,986




Bio Bio Technological Innovation Fund (INNOVA BIO BIO)-CORFO 969
Promotion Project Fund (PROFO) and Technological Assistantship Fund (FAT)-CORFO 25,930
Development and Technological Innovation Program
Development and Technological Innovation Program 3,161




Hallmark and Patent Program 501
Fishery Research Fund (FIP) 4,251
Fishery Promotion Institute 753
Fundacion Chile 1,371
Ministry of Agriculture
Agrarian Innovation Foundation (FIA) 6,665
National Institute of Agrarian Innovation (INIA) 13,820
Forestry Institute (INFOR) 1,776
Natural Resources Information Center (CIREN) 803
Fundacion Chile 1,721
Ministry of Planning and Cooperation
Millenium Scientific Initiative 6,942
Graduate Scholarship Program 9,961
Ministry of Mining
Nuclear Energy Chilean Commission 7,651
Geology and Mining National Service (SERNEAGEOMIN) 7,807
Ministry of Defense
Hydrographic and Oceanographic Service-NAVY 4,928
Military Geographic Institute 2,119
Aerophotogrammetric Service-AIR FORCE 782
Ministry of Foreign Affairs




Institutions such as Natural Resources Research Center, Fishing Promotion 
Institute, National Institute of Standardization, National Institute of Forest Research, 
National Institute of Agrarian Research, National Service of Geology and Mining, 
Mining and Metallurgy Research Center, and the Fundacion Chile are good examples of 
such path. The industry has a low participation on either funding or undertaking R&D 
activity-just 33.25 percent of the R&D is private-funded. According to CNIC-A (2006), 
such situation is explained in light of the lack of innovation-related aspects on the firms’ 
strategy. Most of these firms are part of the economic sectors presenting comparative 
advantages in terms of the national characteristics, and are ranked as large firms in light 
of their size sales.
-Interactions among Chile’s NIS actors
Several scholars have presented assessment reports regarding Chile’s NIS (CNIC-
A, 2006, OECD, 2005; OECD, 2005; Holm-Nielsen and Agapitova, 2002). With regard 
to the Chile’s NIS actors interactions it is feasible to come across with some common 
critical patterns. First, a duplication problem is noted. As S&T agencies do not follow a 
common strategy or are not headed by a central authority, some of their targets may be 
overlapping others agencies’ leading to duplicating funding occurrence. Such lack has 
damaged pursuing more efficient, coherent, and effective public action in terms of the 
coordination and linkage of public S&T agencies. Second, a common critic is the 
weakness of the linkages within Chile’s NIS. At the industry level, OECD (2005) cites 
the low interaction among the agents involved in the clusters’ productive chains as a 
serious constraint to achieve an increasing innovative capacity. Such performance may be 
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due to the mistrust existing among the productive actors leading to higher transaction 
costs putting up the price of innovation. The weak-linkage critic is extended to the public 
research institutes. CNIC-B (2006) notes that usually isolating work is a common 
characteristic of public research institutes achieving low collaboration rates either at the 
national or the international level, deterring them from fruitful participation on S&T 
networks. Nevertheless, the university-industry link is focus of major critics in light of its 
weakness and low exploitation. The causes behind such feeble link may be on the 
university’s lack of a practical and productive vision with regard to research goals 
definition which might lead to develop non-commercially-exploited innovations due to 
their high adaptable or transferable costs. On the other hand, timing and return are still a 
sizeable constraint for increasing innovation rate at the industry level. Most of the firms 
do not conceive yet that innovation may need longer time periods not only to produce 
investment returns but to achieve technical results. Therefore, innovation is still 
perceived by industry as an expensive and long-term-answering activity. Third, with 
regard to educational and training activities, scholars contrast a positive input such as the 
proliferation of graduate programs, particularly at the doctoral level, with their low 
graduating rates, identifying it as a prove of how badly teaching and technical resources 
are managed at the tertiary level (CNIC-A, 2006). They add the low associativity rate 
among national and with international universities as an issue to be corrected in light of 
improving the current quality of local doctoral programs. In addition, S&E education, 
namely tertiary level and Vocational Education Training (VET), has been targeted as no-
matching the industry demand. According to CNIC-A (2006), career supply might not 
been covering the actual worker-skill industry needs as a whole, in light of the low 
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number of degrees offered focused on innovation process relevant areas such as biotech 
and ICTs.
-S&T Public Policies
With regard to S&T Public Policy Implementation, it is worth to highlight that 
most of the S&T Chile’s activity started out with the CONICYT creation in 1967 under 
the Eduardo Frei’s Administration. CONICYT has been portrayed as an important pillar 
of the S&T-activity funding, recognizing it as a professional, committed and transparent 
organization (CIID, 1998). Later on, in 1981, FONDECYT was launched aimed to 
promote basic research among the S&T national community, particularly at the academia 
level. In the early 1990s, with the advent of the democratic governments, several S&T 
reforms took place. The first one of them was the implementation of the Science and 
Technology Program 1992-95 (PCT), a national plan funded by the Inter-American 
Development Bank. The main PCT goal was to promote technological innovation at the 
firm level and to strengthen R&D activities. Two new funds were created: the National 
Fund for Technological and Productive Development (FONTEC) and FONDEF, the 
former under CORFO’s administration and the latter under CONICYT’s. FONTEC 
focused on co-funding technological innovation initiatives at the firm level, whereas 
FONDEF, R&D concentrated on projects proposed by universities associated with firms. 
In addition, FONDECYT was incorporated to the program, and its budget increased. PCT 
was the highest S&T public investment at the time, and in addition to contribute to 
increase Chile’s innovative activity it modified the allocation process by shifting the old 
direct-decision pattern by one based on proposal’s competition, affording higher 
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transparency and efficiency levels. Once PCT period ended, Chilean authorities decided 
to launch a second S&T national plan: Technological Innovation Program 1996-00 (PIT). 
PIT differed from its antecessor in its stronger emphasis on promoting innovation at the 
firm level, decreasing the basic research support in terms of what PCT did. The major 
PIT accomplishments were to position innovation among the industry community as a 
necessary and feasible practice, to contribute to develop new emerging economical 
sectors, and to identify strategic new technological areas (CNIC-A, 2006). Later on, and 
Program of Development and Technological Innovation (PDIT) 2001-06 was launched. 
PDIT’s mission was to accomplish a competitiveness increase by means of supporting 
innovation and technological development in Chile’s economy strategic areas, 
particularly at the SME level. Such aim was stated in light of an early S&T activity 
diagnosis suggesting that despite the successful implementation of the S&T programs 
during the 1990s there were some economical sector innovation-demands that had not 
been addressed (CNIC-A, 2006). The causes behind that would have been the autonomy 
of the market and the “horizontal-type” innovative funds. Thereby, authorities decided to 
implement a strategy based on strengthening some specific “platform” S&T disciplines: 
biotechnology and ICTs. Lately, the Science and Technology Bicentenary Program 
(PBCT) 2003-10 was created aiming to support and to head the process leading Chile into 
the Knowledge Economy by means of investing in S&T and innovation activities 
addressing the industry demands19. The program has promoted an active university-
industry interaction through the implementation of several technological consortium most 
                                                
19 http://www.conicyt.cl/bancomundial/
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of them focusing on adding value to natural resources sectors activity. In spite of the 
accomplishment of each program’s goals, Chile still not has a formal S&T institutionality 
able to propose and to implement a national S&T strategy. The NIS is composed of a 
pool of S&T-oriented institutions spread throughout the public sector. Facing that 
challenge, Chilean authorities are working on a three steps new strategy. First, the 
National Council of Innovation for Competitiveness (CNIC) creation has been proposed 
targeting the integration of all S&T agents, coming from the public, private, and 
academia sectors, under one common umbrella. CNIC will be in charge of designing the 
S&T national policy by means of a process involving all the actors participating currently 
on it. Second, as part of its tasks, CNIC will be responsible of proposing a new S&T 
national strategy which will have to include topics ranging from research areas, human 
capital, and the development, transfer and diffusion of technology. Finally, the National 
Fund of Innovation and Competitiveness (FNIC) will be launched using the 
implementation of a new tax mining whose revenues will be allocated to it. FNIC will 
point to funding innovation initiatives aimed to increase national competitiveness 
consistently with the S&T Strategy goals.
2.3.3.2.2 Finland NIS
In order to offer a thorough description of the Finnish NIS, I present a two-section 
analysis. The first one looks upon the role of NIS actors, focusing on agents involved in 
designing, coordinating, and performing activities. The second one regards description of 
a set of outstanding features of the Finnish NIS, key on the accomplishment of Finland’s 
jump into the knowledge economy. In Figure 12 I present a Finland’s NIS scheme.
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Steering and funding Funding Interaction and participation
Figure 12 Finnish National Innovation System
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-Finland’s NIS Public Actors
With regard to policy making bodies those playing the highest roles are the 
Parliament, the Cabinet, and particularly the Science and Technology Policy Council of 
Finland (STPC). STPC is responsible for the strategic development and coordination of 
Finnish S&T policy as well as of the national innovation system as a whole. Chaired by 
the Prime Minister, its memberships consists of the Minister of Education (MINEDU), 
the Minister of Trade and Industry (MTI), the Minister of Finance, and 0-4 other 
ministers appointed by the Council of State. In addition, ten highest-level representatives 
of academia, industry (Nokia’s CEO at present), the Academy of Finland, the National 
Technology Agency (TEKES), and employers and employee organizations. Thereby, 
STPC is nowadays a platform of discussion where public, private and academic agents 
define the main aims of the innovation national strategy. In order to achieve such task, 
STPC provides a triennial report identifying the main innovation challenges faced by 
Finland along with a set of policy guidelines to overcome them. Published in 2006, 
“Science, Technology and Innovation” is the latest one. It recommends keeping 
strengthening the innovative capability of the Finnish economy, and states as the major 
targets of the Finnish S&T strategy: 1) promote the overall functionality of the innovation 
system and the system’s ability to renew itself, 2) enhance the knowledge base, 3) 
improve the quality and targeting of research, 4) promote the adaptation and 
commercialization of research results, and 5) secure adequate economic prerequisites for 
the activities (STPC, 2006). It is worth to note the social scope of the STPC’s proposal 
showed on the following statement:
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“…education, science, technology, and innovation policies of the coming years may be
judged successful if they contribute to the development of the whole society and the 
innovation system in the intended manner…” (STPC, 2006, p.2)
MINEDU and MTI are the two most important ministries within Finland’s NIS. 
Together both ministries oversee nearly 80 percent of the R&D public budget (ERRIN, 
2005). MINEDU manages 21 universities and 31 polytechnics aiming to address both the 
high skill worker and the knowledge market demands. Nevertheless, the main MINEDU 
task has to do with the administration of The Academy of Finland. Founded in its present 
form in 1970, the Academy aimed to fund basic research and to support academic careers 
by means of individual projects competition and academic posts and training. Nowadays, 
The Academy groups its task on four councils, Biosciences and Environment, Culture 
and Society, Natural Sciences, and Engineering and Health. The broad scope of The 
Academy’s working areas has afforded a strong funding competition among Finnish 
researchers. Applicants have notably increased, receiving The Academy three times more 
applications than it is able to fund (ERRIN, 2005). One of the most important 
achievements of The Academy has been the establishment since 1993 of the Centres of 
Excellence, research group aimed to develop cutting edge research whose selection has 
been made following an open competition process based on high quality standards.
MTI is more focused on promoting S&T at the industry level, handling 
technological policies, and administrating TEKES. Established in 1983, TEKES has 
played a significant role in funding technological development in Finland by channeling 
nearly 30 percent of the public research budget (ERRIN, 2005). TEKES funds mostly 
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proposals coming from industry, particularly those presenting a high level of risk. In 
addition, it look forwards networking and internationalization, and often is not the only 
financer of the approved proposals. Proposals involving high levels of networking were 
strongly rewarded by TEKES. Castells and Himanen (2001) point out that the more 
networking there is between large companies, between large and small and medium 
companies, or between SMEs, the larger the TEKES funding share, rising from 50 to 70 
percent. In addition Castells and Himanen stress three features: 1) TEKES efficiency in 
funding R&D aiming at exportable products, emphasizing its involvement in all 
successful Finnish technology companies at some point in their development, including 
Nokia; 2) TEKES administration autonomy, despite the agency is responsible to MTI, the 
latter is not involved in funding decision, affording it to act with a much longer 
perspective than if it were within political structure; and 3) TEKES acts proactively and 
reactively, the agency has been able to define its own working areas through steering 
committees implementation in which industry actors have had an important participation; 
notwithstanding, TEKES is not closed to new research areas that may not be part of its 
own technological programs but may be included in new individual proposals.
Closing the main chain of S&T funding-agencies is the Finnish Fund for Research 
and Development (SITRA). Created in 1967, SITRA provides venture capital and support 
firms exploring new innovative field areas and conducting experimental research. The 
agency is nowadays a venture capitalist institution funding the seed and expansion steps 
of start-up companies whose development phase has been already financed by TEKES. 
Therefore, both agencies work very close. In fact, 95 percent of the SITRA-funded 
proposals have already received money from TEKES. In addition, SITRA reinforces its 
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explorative profile promoting technology diffusion and foresight by means of funding 
technological seminars and conducting innovation policy assessment studies. Castells and 
Himanen (2001) define SITRA’s role as to be a “public capitalist” and an “unofficial 
strategist”.
-Performers
The main Finnish research performers are universities, polytechnics, research 
institutes and firms. Universities perform world-class research in several fields, standing 
out the high tech work of the technical universities in Helsinki, Tampere and 
Lappeenranta. The excelling university performance is reinforced by the industrial 
research development, which accounts for 68 percent of the national S&T expenditures20. 
Nokia have played a fundamental role on achieving an increasing private R&D funding. 
Nokia has experienced an explosive growth period as an outcome of its technology-
oriented market strategy increasing its stock market value from around 1 billion dollars in 
1990 to 230 billion dollars in 2000, representing 70 percent of the total capitalization at 
the Helsinki Stock Exchange (Blomstrom et al, 2002). Nowadays, Nokia’s global market 
share in mobile phones is nearly on third, and the company accounted for 70-80 percent 
of Finland’s ICT exports, 45 percent of ICT production, and 30 percent of ICT 
employment (IMF, 2001). Blomstron et al (2001) point out that about a third of Nokia’s 
worldwide employees work in R&D, and that company’s R&D expenditures represent 30 
percent of Finland’s R&D investment. In addition of universities and firms, twenty public 
                                                
20 http://www.stat.fi
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research institutes such as the Technical Research Center (VTT), the National Public 
Health Institute, the Institute of Occupational Health, the Forest Research Institute and 
the Agri-food Research Finland conduct R&D. With regards to VTT, defined as the 
largest research institute in the Nordic Countries, it carries out mainly applied research, 
hired by private contractors, affording it a significant level of autonomy. VTT employs 
roughly 2,720 researchers and provide R&D for over 6,000 domestic and international 
customers21.
One of the main boosters of Finnish innovation has been the spread of 
intermediary institutions across the country. This category includes science and 
technology parks, technology transfer companies, industrial liaison offices and 
innovation centers as well. Their roles range from offering innovative business 
environment and infrastructure, being home of several industrial companies in the case of 
S&T parks, to promoting the commercialization of research results from universities and 
research institutes. Such technology transfer companies help costumers in assessing new 
research results, patenting, licensing, business development, and marketing. Regarding 
the S&T parks operation, it is worth to highlight the existence of the Finnish Science Park 
Association (TEKEL). Founded in 1988, TEKEL has nowadays 23 members, involving 2 
400 enterprises, 50 000 experts working on different technology fields such as ICT, 
healthcare and medical technology, biotechnology, environmental and food technology, 
materials research and digital media22.
                                                
21 VTT in figures, http://www.vtt.fi/vtt/vtt_in_figures.jsp
22 TEKEL, http://www.tekel.fi/english/
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-The Finnish Education System
Dahlman et al (2005) identify education as the key element of a knowledge-based, 
innovation-driven economy, since human capital complements technological change. 
They point out that an insufficiently trained worked force may be a serious barrier to 
achieve the new technologies in production. Finland has not been the rule exception. Its 
educational system is soundly built upon of model consisting of basic education, post-
comprehensive school, higher and adult education(see Figure 13) with each level ranked 
among the best worldwide (OECD, 2000). Finnish public education spending accounts 
for 13 percent of all public expenditure, with two third of it coming from State funding 
and the third left from Municipal funding.
The current shape of the Finland educational system has been the outcome of a 
steady upgrade process started at mid-twentieth century driven by an increasing social 
demand for academically educated labor. At the beginning of the century just three 
universities located in the urbanized areas of Helsinki and Turku formed the tertiary 
Finnish educational system. In the late 1960s, Finland carried out a significant university 
reform aimed to set a geographical homogenously training capacity throughout the 
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Figure 13 The Education System in Finland
Source: MINEDU (2004)
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Finland by establishing universities in the Oulu, Joensuu, Lappeenranta and, Kuopio 
Regions.
The number of students increases at a 20-30,000 rate per decade between 1960 
and 1990, whereas in light of the strengthening of the ICT cluster during the 1990s, such 
rate rose to 45,000 students per year (ERRIN, 2005). Nowadays, there are 21 universities 
in Finland specialized in fields such as technology, engineering, economics and business 
management, or art. Nevertheless all of them present a common characteristic: the basic 
goal of performing R&D providing a tertiary training in connection with it. In the early 
1990s, a polytechnic reform took place aimed to address the increasing demand for 
specialized technological training driven in part by the ICTs blossoming. A network of 31 
polytechnics was gradually implemented by means of a merging process of different 
vocational educational schools upgrading their education level to meet the standards of 
higher education. The number of polytechnic students has risen twentyfold since the early 
1990s (Kekkonen, 2005). The success of the higher education improvement process has 
afforded meeting the high skill worker industry demand, granting that more than 30 
percent of Finland’s population have a higher education degree.
Finland’s nine years is offered in comprehensive schools and it is an obligation 
for every Finnish citizen to complete it. Post-comprehensive school education is given by 
upper secondary schools and vocational schools, the former covers all the country and 
lasts three year at the end of which students take the national matriculation exam. Finnish 
vocational schools Finnish vocational education is traditionally institution-based to a 
large extent (MINEDU, 2004). A mix of taught courses and on-the-job training is 
included in the study program. With regard to adult education, worth to note is that is 
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offered at about 1,000 institutions throughout the country, with more than 1 million 
people participating on it (MINEDU, 2004).
-University-Industry Relationship
Finland’s NIS has been identifying as an international benchmark regarding 
university-industry cooperation. In 2003, most of large company R&D projects and 80 
percent of SMEs R&D projects involve university participation (ERRIN, 2005). Such 
cooperating relationship has strongly stimulated knowledge creation, technology transfer, 
and an increasing social capital. Nevertheless, such achievement has been the outcome of 
a long and steady upgrading process. In the 1970s, cooperation with industry was not 
promoted among universities whose role was mainly associated with their educational 
goal postponing research activities. Along the 1980s and 1990s the trend shifted by 
establishing a set of public policies focusing on addressing the industry R&D demand. As 
the NIS approach was adopted as the economic development strategy, economic 
effectiveness of research was given higher priority. The R&D funding mechanism was 
modified not only by increasing significantly the university-research budget but also by 
defining research cooperation with industry as the most important factor on the 
allocation-decision. In addition, the severe recession experienced by Finland at the early 
1990s had a “collateral” effect on university-industry research. As the recession went on, 
a set of cutbacks affected the R&D funding system, therefore Finnish universities 
experienced severe decreases on their research budgets being compelled to look for new 
R&D funding sources, since public allocations were mostly channeled to education 
expenditures. Thus, external R&D funding sources represented a fruitful solution not 
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only for universities but also for industry whose R&D demand became the main driver of 
new R&D university proposals. Following such trend, the amount of external research 
funding in the higher education was at the end of 2002 at 57 percent of which 13 percent 
came from foreign companies (ERRIN, 2005).
-Venture Capital
The growth of the Finnish venture capital market  and the innovation-driven-
economy-strategy promotion have been two complementary phenomenons by mutually 
strengthening each other. Since the early 1980s, SITRA began to create a set of venture 
capital funds not previously available in Finland. The venture capital market experienced 
a rapid evolution (see Table 5). In 1988, just 18 venture capital companies were in 
operation managing a total capital of 100 million euros, whereas in the upper 1990s, 
particularly driven by the ICT boom, the number of venture capital companies had tripled 
and their budgets were about 300 million euros (ERRIN, 2005). Nowadays, more than 50 
venture capital companies are operating in Finland managing 3.2 billion euros. According 
to ERRIN (2005), in 2002 these companies made a total of 462 investments amounting to 
391 million euros.
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TABLE 5 Finland’s Venture Capital Investments 1995-2000







1995 122 6 37.8 34
1996 137 12 83.8 122
1997 205 50 136.4 63
1998 265 29 192.4 41
1999 350 32 285.4 48
2000 420 20 403.7 41
Source: IMF (2001)
-Regional Innovation Systems
Finland has been able of building a set of regional innovation systems over R&D 
activities. Such regional rise has been the outcome of several R&D, politic, and 
economical measures. With regard to R&D capacity building, Finland launched in the 
late 1960s a technological university network which has afforded a steady and 
homogenous high-skill workers supply along the country. The effect of such initiative 
was strengthened in the early 1990s with the implementation of the polytechnic network 
affording higher rates of science and engineering graduates. The enactment of the 
Regional Development Act in 1994 was a major driver of the Finnish decentralization 
process. The Act aimed to increase the role of local government in regional policy by 
delegating power from the central to the regional level. Such power delegation was 
strengthened by launching two important economic development organizations at the 
regional level: The Employment and Economic Development Center (EEDC) and the 
Center of Expertise Program (CEP). EEDCs support SMEs, promote technological 
development in firms, and assist in matters concerning export, patent, and 
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internationalization activities. CEPs aim to increase local R&D capacities by building 
regional centers of innovation in various technology fields related to regional strengths. 
Both institutions involved the participation of different participations. The former 
includes representatives of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Labor, and 
the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture, whereas the latter are implemented over the 
cooperation between industry, local governments, technology centers, universities, 
polytechnics, and research institutes.
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CHAPTER 3
MODEL, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section I present a brief literature review regarding the impact and 
contribution of technological change in economic growth in order to introduce the 
analytical model used to achieve the research goals. Next, I present the model and its 
results followed by the analysis of them which is concentrated on the main factors behind 
the S&T gap among the two countries.
3.1 Literature review
The challenge of modeling economic growth has followed a long path. Solow 
(1956, 1957) identifies growth performance as the result of the accumulation of factors, 
namely capital and labor, predicting declining rates for nations with high capital labor 
ratios. Assuming diminishing marginal productivity of capital, constant saving and 
population growth rates, Solow predicts that all countries converge in the long-run to the 
same level of income. In addition he assumes that the technological progress is 
exogenous and does not respond to incentives. It is worth to note that the technology 
exogenous Solow’s definition remained as a key part of economic growth modeling 
during an extensive period, despite some notable challenges such as Arrow’s (1962) 
model of learning by doing, and Uzawa’s (1965) model of human-capital driven 
improvements.
Later on several facts led to question the exogenous feature assigned to 
technology by Solow. Helpman (2004) cites as one of Solow’s limitation the persistence 
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of high growth rates in richest countries over time, even improving their performance in 
some cases. Despite the world growth, convergence has not been a common situation. As 
a result of such discussion, the endogenous growth theory emerged with Romer (1986) 
and Lucas (1988) as its main precursors. Romer argues that growth not only depend on 
labor and capital, but also on an economy’s stock knowledge which rises as firms invest 
in knowledge accumulation. At the same time, he points out that firms’ output not only 
depend on their own private stock of knowledge but on the aggregate economy’s stock of 
knowledge. Knowledge accumulation generates externalities which allow increasing 
return to scale which offset the decreasing return to scale from factor accumulation. 
Lucas (1988) introduces the use of externalities but associated to human capital. He states 
that the decreasing marginal return of capital can be offset as long as the average level of 
human capital in the economy is high, leading to growth rates higher than technological 
progress. Later on, several studies have analyzed the role of education and human capital 
in economic growth such as: Goldin and Katz (2001) regarding the case of the US, and 
Young (1995), regarding Asian countries.
Romer (1990) expands the endogenous growth theory disaggregating his own 
model. Regarding copyrights, Romer points out that innovators have incentives to 
innovate, and at the same time, innovators create knowledge beyond copyright limits 
which can be used by everybody (spillovers). He states that at the nation level the higher 
the R&D investment the higher the productivity growth which is endogenous since it 
depends on the economy’s characteristics especially those which determine the saving 
rate. Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) present alternative 
interpretations where products are not equally substitutable, going against Romer’s 
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assumption, and improve along quality ladders. They state that improvement over time 
increases growth performance.
The Solow’s convergence theory has been retaken by several scholars. Following 
the rational that countries differ in their population growth and saving rates and basing 
their work on Solow’s premises, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw et al (1992) 
state that rich countries and poor countries converge to different income levels. On the 
other hand, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) note that ignoring the complementarity 
between technological progress and capital accumulation leads to underestimating the 
role of technology in development. Acemoglu and Zilliboti (2001) reinforce the role of 
interaction between human capital and technological progress as growth catalysts. 
Easterly and Levine (2001) points out that long-term development is mainly driven by the 
portion of growth that is unrelated to capital accumulation. Mainly, as Lederman and 
Saenz (2005, p.2) states “growth seems to depend crucially on factors that determine the 
rate of technological progress that might be country specific as opposed to common to all 
countries”.
Helpman (2004) points out that more than half of the cross-country variation in 
income per capita comes from differences in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) levels 
whose fluctuations are mainly due to diverging R&D investment rates. On one hand, 
innovating-countries benefit from its own R&D and from other countries’s R&D, 
whereas less developed countries benefit mainly from innovating-countries R&D 
activities since their low R&D investment rates prevents them from having a strong local 
R&D capacity. Following such rational Helpman argues that the world technology 
frontier is pushed forward by an all-countries effort, and this influences in a differential 
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manner the growth of countries at different development stages, and thereby their TFP 
speed growth. Industrialized countries have to innovate to move the technological frontier 
forward, whereas LDCs are just in the middle of a catching up process; therefore, returns 
to R&D investment vary according to the level of development, the richer the country, 
the smaller returns to R&D.
3.2 The Model
I test two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Chile’s R&D contribution to national income per capita has been higher 
than Finland’s over the period 1981-2000.
Hypothesis 2: NRA has been a better complement of R&D in the case of Chile than 
Finland over the period 1981-2000.
I define the model on prior empirical work regarding economic growth which has 
followed research based on Solow’s model. I define as the dependent variable the log of 
GDP per capita over the 1981-2000 period. The analysis includes as independent 
variables investment as a fraction of GDP (I); labor growth measured as yearly growth 
rate of the economic active population (L); the share of R&D expenditures in GDP (RD); 
and the share of natural resources exports in total exports (NR)23. With regard to RD, lags 
                                                
23 As natural resources endowment is measured in value terms it captures not only supply effects but also 
impact on current account and/or in exchange rate of higher prices of some commodities
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of several kinds are likely to be occurred between R&D expenditures and economic 
growth (Rouvinen, 2002). Goal and Ram (1994) cite three of them as the most 
significant. Firstly, there is a lag between R&D spent and completion of projects. 
Secondly, there may be a lag between project completion and the increase on productivity 
which may lead to economic growth. Thirdly, there is bell-shaped pattern in the time path 
of increase in productivity. Defining the lag value to be used, the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics proposes using a 2-years-lag for applied research and 5-years-lag for basic 
research; however, its analysis is just focused on US Industry, not including plausible 
country endogenous features. CNIC-B (2006) identifies 4-years-lag as a lagging average, 
highlighting that such definition varies across industries from 2 years for 
telecommunication and electronic equipment to 5 years for pharmaceutical industry. 
Comparing Chile and Finland, I opt for a 5-years-lag for one reason: Chile’s R&D has 
been mainly concentrated on basic research funding so that considering a shorter lag 
period would be shrinking its actual return to R&D.
The data used are from the World Development Indicators dataset, International 
Labor Organization (ILO), Chilean National Commission of Science and Technology 
(CONICYT), Statistics Finland, and the COMTRADE database. I describe the data and 
their sources in more detail in Appendix A. I run the following OLSs with robust 
standard errors (preventing heteroskedasticity) for each country case:
Log GDPpci = α0 + α1*Ii + α2*Li + α3*RDi + Ei [1]
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As a second step I include the NR variable and an interaction term (RD*NR) in 
order to analyze the NRA effect and the relationship between NRA and R&D investment. 
I run the following regression again separately in each country case:
Log GDPpci = α0 + α1*Ii + α2*Li + α3*RDi + α4*NRi + α5 RD*NR + Ei [2]
In order to confirm or to reject the hypothesis 1, I compare the values of α3 of 
each country-case in regression [1]. To confirm or to reject hypothesis 2, I compare the 
values of α5 of each country-case in regression [2].
3.3 Results
The results are presented in Table 6. Regarding Hypothesis 1, in both country 
cases the share of R&D expenditures in GDP is positively correlated with income per 
capita. For the case of Chile, an increase of 1 percentual point in the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to GDP has increased by 29.215 percent GDP per capita. For Finland, an 
increase of 1 percentual point in the ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP has increased by 
27.89 percent GDP per capita. For Chile and Finland the variable is significant at the 1 
percent level. Hypothesis 1 is accepted.
Regarding Hypothesis 2, the interaction term RD*NR is positively correlated with 
income per capita in the Chile’s case, whereas it is negatively correlated in the Finland’s 
case. That would mean that in the case of Chile higher R&D expenditures would decrease 
the negative effect of NRA on income per capita, and that in the case of Finland a higher 
level of NRA decreases the positive effect of R&D expenditures. The variable is 
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significant at the 5 percent and at the 1 percent level in Chile’s and Finland’s cases 
respectively. Hypothesis 2 is accepted. 
TABLE 6 Results
EQUATION 1 EQUATION 2
CHILE FINLAND CHILE FINLAND
Investment/GDP 0.216626*** 0.188143*** 0.0164888*** 0.0168206***
Labor Growth -0.524572*** 0.573885*** -0.4584461*** 0.2665227 
R&D/GDP 0.291519*** 0.278951*** -3.819181* 0.47787***
Natural Resources -.037045*** 0.0107955*
R&D/GDP*NR .0455671** -0.0182648***
Constant 9.558367 8.939639 12.8033*** 8.986311***
R2 0.9809 0.8717 0.9903 0.9131
Observations 20 20 20 20
*** significant at 1%
** significant at 5%
* significant at 10%
I undertake heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity tests. With regard to the 
former, the analysis suggests heteroskedasticity presence in both country-case equations; 
therefore I use OLS with robust standard errors. Running STATA-VIF tests, I check 
multicollinearity in both cases suggesting that there is no presence of it in any of the 
analyzed regressions. In Annex B, I present heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity tests. 
In the next section, I present analyses on both hypotheses results. The first part is focused 
on Hypothesis 1 analyzing why Chile presents a better return to R&D investment than 
Chile. Such analysis starts off having in mind the catching up feature of technological 
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change and considering three factors: institutionalization, education, and decentralization. 
Next, I dive on Hypothesis 2, discussing what reasons might be behind the natural 
resources performances of each country.
3.4 Analysis
3.4.1 Hypothesis 1
Before pointing to Hypothesis 1 results discussion, I stop on the analysis of two 
variables considered in Equation 1: Investment Rate and Labor Growth. It is worth to 
note that in both cases, the return to R&D is higher than the return to physical investment. 
In addition, the return to physical capital is higher for Chile’s case than Finland. Those 
results are consistent with those of Lederman and Maloney (2003) who points out that 
returns to physical capital investment decrease with development. Regarding labor 
growth, in the case of Chile the variable is negatively correlated with income per capita, 
whereas in the case of Finland the correlationship is positive. In both cases, the variable 
is significant at the 1 percent level. At first sight, we may be leaned to conclude that as 
Finland has a high-quality education system, with high enrollment rates and high average 
years of schooling, an increase in the labor force may lead to an increase in the 
availability of high skill workers, having the economy to its disposal a better trained 
manpower. Following that rational, the negative correlationship of the Chilean case may 
be explained by the lower quality of its educational system which would generate on 
average workers with lower skill than Finnish workers. Nevertheless, other factors have 
to be taken into account. Economic Active Population (EAP) may vary according to 
economy’s fluctuations. As economies jump into recession times EAP may increase or 
decrease, since either more people starts looking for job or people get discouraged. In 
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recovery periods, EAP may either grow pushed by an increasing amount of people 
looking forward getting a new job as the odds of achieving one increase or decrease as 
the so called “secondary” labor force returns to home. It is worth to note that in the long 
run EAP and economy growth may vary following the same direction but in the short 
term such pattern may be different. During the considered period (1981-2000), Chile and 
Finland went trough pervasive economical crisis: the 1982-83 recession and the early 
1990s recession in Chile and Finland respectively. Therefore EAP effect might be pushed 
by endogenous short term factors which have to be considered analysis EAP effect on 
economic growth.
Back to Hypothesis 1, Barro (1991) points out that an R&D’s dollar buys greater 
increases in productivity for LDC than for innovating countries. Lederman and Maloney 
(2003) estimate R&D return rates between 20-40 percent for OECD countries; around 60 
percent for medium income countries; and close to 100 percent for relatively poor 
countries, covering the 1960-2000 period. Previously, Goel and Ram (1994) estimate an 
R&D return rate of 19.6 percent for a sample of 52 nations including innovating countries 
and LDCs. They replicate the model by limiting the sample to 18 LDCs, estimating an 
R&D return rate of 41.5 percent. Therefore, the results obtained are in accordance with 
previous research and particularly with the central statement that a R&D dollar has a 
higher return in LDCs than in industrialized or innovating countries. In my model, 
Finland’s wealthier innovation-driven economy would be the reason of Chile’s R&D 
return better performance. However, we must have in mind that in order to reach its 
current economical and technological level Finland started out decades ago a 
comprehensive process involving socio, economic, and political issues leading to an 
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increasing stock of knowledge. At this point, it is worth to bring up Helpman (2004) who 
notes that the transformation of Western countries into modern economies would have 
not been possible without the formation of institutions that encouraged the creation and 
accumulation of knowledge and its application to new technologies. What has been the 
Finland’s case? According to Lemola (2003) a systemic upgrading of public policies, 
institutions and instruments are the seed of the R&D Finland’s success. Public policies 
were designed aiming to meet the dynamics of not only the local but the global industry 
innovation demand. In addition, Dahlman et al (2005) cite education as a second pillar of 
Finland’s success by defining it as “the key to both the supply and demand of 
innovation”. They state that in absence of a sufficiently trained workforce new 
technologies hardly would be adopted or created: human capital complements 
technological advances. Another interesting feature of Finland’s economical 
transformation is that meeting becoming an innovating country Finland was able of 
accomplishing a geographical-homogenous development. In general, high rates of 
economical and population concentration may become significant barriers to 
development, particularly for innovation nodes emergence (Castells and Hall, 1994). 
Finnish authorities achieved regional development by implementing strategies based on 
using higher education and R&D as engines of regional economic growth (Castells and 
Himanen, 2001).
I state an analysis of the evolution of S&T public policies in both countries 
aimed to identify the R&D-factors that led Finland to leave behind its natural resources 
dependency transforming it in an innovation-driven economy. Such pool is part of the set 
of causes explaining its current wealth which would justify the return to R&D model 
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estimates with Chile’s outperforming Finland’s. I focus on three categories: a) 
Institutionalization, regarding the evolution of institutions and public policies related with 
S&T, b) Learning, regarding the human capital policies and their influence in S&T 
developments, and c) Decentralization, regarding the role of regional development in 
knowledge generation.
3.4.1.1 Institutionalization
Castells and Himanen (2001) points out that it would be wrong to claim that 
“the rise of information technology was just a result of the recession, and even more 
wrong to think that Finnish information-societies strategies written since 1994 have been 
its source”. In the early 1960s, Finland’s industry was mainly concentrated on natural 
resources exploitation and characterized by a low level of technology deterring it from 
having a competitive position at international markets. Therefore, catching up with more 
competitive economies was the main shaping force setting the S&T national system. 
Such task was carried out taking into account the example of more developed countries 
and the trade liberalization dominant trend at the time.
Lemola (2003) breaks down the S&T public policies development in three eras: 
a) R&D policy, b) Technology policy, and c) Innovation policy. The also called “Era of 
R&D Policy” covering the 1960s and the 1970s was characterized by the setting up of 
some of the main Finnish S&T organizations regarding planning, funding, and 
coordination tasks. The Science Policy Council (SPC), a ministerial committee, was 
created in 1963 aimed to coordinate R&D actions. In 1961, the older research councils 
were gathered under a central body, the Academy of Finland assuming the research 
funding task. The Finnish National Fund for Research and Development (SITRA) was 
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established in 1967 to support industrial R&D. Once the laying of S&T system 
foundations occurred, a singular discussion on how to carry out the development Finland 
S&T started. Partisans of science-oriented strategy promoted strengthening the role of the 
Ministry of Education and its operational agencies as coordinators and funding agents, 
and to concentrate science development on university research. On the other hand, 
interested groups promoted a technology-oriented strategy highlighting the role of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. At the beginning the science-oriented trend dominated 
the scene; however, at the turn of the 1970s, the technology partisans gained room in the 
discussion leading technology to become the center concept of future S&T strategies.
During the 1980s, Finland left behind a science-oriented positions promoting 
technology as the core of its goals. Technology was perceived as an instrument able to 
raise economic growth through the emergence of the new business areas. The “Era of 
Technology Policy” started out characterized by an increasing government role regarding 
industrial innovation promotion. As an outcome of such strategy, the government decided 
to raise the S&T expenditures from 1.2 percent of GDP in 1982 to 2.2 percent by 1992 
(Castells and Himanen, 2001). In order to meet the new-strategy goals, two key 
organizations were created: the National Technology Agency (TEKES) in 1983 and the 
Science and Technology Policy (STPC) in 1987, based on the former SPC. In addition, 
the decade was well-known by the creation of several technology transfer, diffusion and 
commercialization organizations stemming the emergence at a steady pace of spin offs 
and technology parks. The last phase “The Era of Innovation Policy” started at the early
1990s. The assimilation of the concepts of National Innovation System and OECD-
Knowledge-based Society was the main driven of growth. Finland integrated the NIS 
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systemic approach of innovation and in order to adapt the OECD premise created the 
conditions for knowledge-intensive growth by implementing measures relating to R&D, 
education, competitive conditions, intellectual property, national and international 
networks, and technology transfer and exploitation (Lemola, 2003).
Comparing the Finland S&T development with Chile’s, several differences can 
be highlighted. Firstly, since the late 1960s Finland has had a central public organization 
in charge of governing and planning the S&T national system: STPC. Organized directly 
under the Prime Minister’s authority, STPC states the major goals and tasks regarding 
S&T, using a top down approach to spread its decisions (Castells and Himanen, 2001). 
Chile lacks such type of organization. Each public agency involved sets its own planning 
regardless external activities. Even more, despite the inclusion in its title of the “National 
Commission” concept, CONICYT has not been a planning discussion organization. Its 
role has been restricted mainly to funding tasks. It is worth to note that as an outcome of 
the discussion on the allocation of funds coming to S&T tasks from a new mining tax, a 
National Innovation Council for Competitiveness (CNIC) integrated by public, private 
and academic agents has been recently created. However, it would be advisable that 
CNIC’s role goes beyond the mining tax funds allocation discussion, covering issues 
such as the Chilean S&T system governance and even more assuming an STPC role 
alike; otherwise current problems such as duality in funding and task allocation, and lack 
of homogeneity in the decision-making research area process will not be completely 
overcome.
Secondly, in general, the S&T public supporting structure has been set up much 
earlier in Finland than Chile. Organizations such as SPC, Academy of Finland and 
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SITRA were established in the 1960s. In the case of Chile, only CONICYT was created 
at that time, and its first significant fund, FONDECYT, was just established in 1981, and 
aimed to just fund basic research activities. Regarding technology institutionalization, 
despite its main boost started in the late 1970s, especially with the creation of Tekes, 
several prior policies had defined it as one of the main public agencies targets. In the case 
of Chile, the advent of democratic government in the early 1990s was the main 
technology-policy driven. The launch of several technology-oriented-publicly-funded 
programs was accompanied by a reorientation of CORFO’s goal. Since the early 1990s 
CORFO has been the main promoter of technological development at the firm level in 
Chile, leaving behind its prior industrialization promoter role. Comparing only the setting 
dates of the public organizations involved in NIS, including the reorientation of 
preexisting agencies, there is a significant delay in the Chilean case regarding Finland. 
Thirdly, as part of the NIS, and as it was mentioned before, Chile lacks 
significant private investment in innovation. Only a 33.2 percent is funded by the private 
sector, contrasting with the 70.8 percent of Finland, and the OECD average of 65 percent. 
According to CNIC-C (2006), such performance is an outcome of the scarce relevance 
attributed to innovation within the firms’ strategy, and to the innovation absence in their 
productive routines. Such rational is in part related with the commodities-intensive 
productive structure dominant in Chile, which deters the country from added-value-
chains. Even though Chilean firms well-perform regarding “soft” innovation related with 
management tasks, “hard” innovation has not been a common target in Chilean firm 
practices. Such premise has led to lack of innovation culture which is reinforced by 
several factors at the firm level: low availability of venture capital; scarce presence of 
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individuals with technological innovation management capacity; insufficient information 
regarding public innovation supports; and the weak firm interaction at cluster level 
(CNIC-C, 2006). Such situation diverges from Finnish policy of incentives. Tekes has 
fully assumed its funding research task for which it has been recognized at the 
international level (Castells and Himanen, 2001). According to Schienstock (2005) one of 
the most effective ways to improve the quality of research in Finland has been increasing 
the share of competitive funds. Besides, SITRA has evolved from a funded technology
research task to a venture capitalist role aimed to finance the beginning and expansion of 
start-up companies that have already received research funds from Tekes.
3.4.1.2 Education
According to Maloney (2002), learning capacity is built over national human 
capital performance and the networks of institutions that facilitate the adoption and 
creation of new technologies. I focus my analysis on variables regarding human capital 
capacity by breaking down the analysis into three categories: literacy, primary and 
secondary enrollment, and tertiary enrollment.
Since the nineteenth century, Scandinavian countries have followed a tradition of 
high literacy rate. Finland has not been the exception: almost 89 percent was literate in 
1890 (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1995). In contrast, Chile inherited from its Spanish 
colonizers, a rentier and low-entrepreneurial mentality which led to both a high 
concentration of wealthy individuals and high rates of marginalization affecting the 
access to education: Chilean literacy rate was barely 30.3 percent in 1890 (Engerman et 
al, 1997). Despite its significant increase over the years (literacy rate reached 95.8 
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percent in 2002) the earlier low Chile’s literacy performance represented a serious 
disadvantage.
Regarding primary and secondary enrollment rate, both countries have reached 
high levels during the last decades. Firstly, both countries have attained gross enrollment 
rates of primary education above 100 percent in 2004: 101 percent in Finland and 104 
percent in Chile. Worth to highlight is Chile’s behavior regarding gross enrollment rate of 
secondary education, jumping from 53 percent in 1980 to 89 percent in 2004. Such 
increase was based on strong coverage policies undertaken during the 1990s with the 
advent of democratic governments. However, despite of such progress, Chile’s 
educational system still presents several quality disadvantages regarding Finland’s. 
Chile’s performance in the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 
of students was poor ranking 35th among 38 countries in both categories math and 
science, whereas Finland ranks at 14th and 10th positions respectively (TIMSS, 1999).
The tertiary education enrollment presents the most significant difference. At the 
early 1980s, Finland had a gross tertiary enrollment of 32 percent which increased up to 
90 percent in 2004. During the same period, Chile started at a low 12 percent, attaining in 
2004 a 43 percent rate, mainly boosted by the emergence of private-funded universities. 
Among tertiary students the Science and Engineering (S&E) enrollment rates score at 
similar levels: 31.4 percent for Chile, and 38.2 percent for Finland. I highlight such 
statistic due to the S&T input category of S&E graduates. Most of them will work on 
either technological development issue or knowledge creation, and some of them will be 
part of the S&T national community. In that sense, the number of researchers in both 
countries has increased during the last decades but at different pace. The number of 
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researchers in Finland has seen an increase of almost threefold during the 1983-2001 
period whereas in the case of Chile, the increase was by 52 percent24. Furthermore, 
Finnish researchers have a major likelihood to work in the private sector than their 
Chilean colleagues: 30 percent of them jump into local firms whereas just 6 percent do it 
in Chile (Tokman and Zahler, 2004).
In 1981, the OECD made a review of Finnish educational policy recommending 
carrying out a thorough polytechnic reform, which was rejected by the Finnish authorities 
at the time arguing that such proposal was out of the national targets therefore an 
allocation of resources was not feasible (MINEDU, 2004). However, later on MINEDU 
restudied the OECD proposal, and decided to launch a Vocational Education and 
Training (VET) reform which would include not only the establishment of polytechnics 
but also a strong cooperation between upper secondary schools and post-comprehensive 
vocational schools (MINEDU, 2004).
In 1991, the Finnish Parliament enacted the beginning of the VET reform. 
Following this legislation, 22 polytechnics were set up across the country, merging the 
250 VET’s schools existing at the time according to disciplinary and regional criterias 
(MINEDU, 2004). The new polytechnics have undergone rapid growth. Between 1992 
and 1999 the number of applicants and the number of first-year student rose fourfold and 
fivefold respectively. It is worth to note that 89,700 people applied for 24,040 places in 
2000. However, the most impressive increase regards the total number of polytechnic 
students, which have risen twentyfold since the early 1990s (Kekkonen, 2005).
                                                
24 CONICYT Indicators, www.conicyt.cl
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3.4.1.3 Decentralization
According to Kautonen et al (2005), Finnish regional innovation systems 
successfully implemented have afforded GDPs 20 percent higher than the national 
performance for those regions over the 1995-1999 period. However such success has 
been paved over two main development factors: human capital and institutions. 
Regarding human capital, the National Government aimed to prevent a high concentrated 
supply of high skill workers by implementing, from the 1960s onwards a network of 
regional universities with emphasis on engineering and technology. Before that, only 
Helsinki and Turku had full universities. Castells and Himanen (2001) cites several 
Finnish regions as examples of regional development regarding the technological 
university settlement: Tampere, where two universities played a major role in the 
implementation of the Tampere’s information cluster; Oulu, nowadays an ICT pole which 
has transformed the region in the fourth major metropolitan node in Finland; Rovaniemi, 
where setting up a new technology-oriented university was the key for the revival of high 
value-added industries, and Lappeenranta, where the process of growth was clearly 
associated with the presence of a new technology-oriented university. The polytechnic 
reform started in the early 1990s, with a clear homogenous-development criteria, has 
been the “second wave” of this technology-regional-oriented educational reform by 
covering the demand of high skill workers able to participate of high tech production 
process. Regarding institutions, the national government undertook important reforms. 
First, a reduction of the number of administrative districts was implemented looking for a 
lower bureaucracy and higher capacity to shape more fitted regional innovation policies 
(Schienstock, 2005). The Center of Expertise Program (CEP) was launched in 1994 
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aimed to improve knowledge base by focusing on regional strengths and by promoting 
joint-multidisciplinary project. In addition, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of 
Labour and Ministry of Agriculture jointly combined their regional efforts in the 
Employment and Economic Development Centers (EEDC) at the regional level. Fifteen 
centres countrywide has been settled providing a comprehensive range of advisory and 
development services for businesses, entrepreneurs, and private individuals. Both types 
of factors have contributed to the emergence of technology parks throughout Finland 
taking advantage of public incentives and well-trained manpower.
With regard of the Chilean case, I organize the analysis in two points. Firstly, 
Chile historically has been a concentrated country in terms of population and political 
and economical power. Nowadays, forty percent of the population lives in Santiago25, the 
national capital, whereas just 18 percent of Finnish population lives in Helsinki26. Despite 
some governmental initiatives and the Regional Reform launched in 1992, Chilean 
political and economical powers are mainly concentrated in Santiago. Secondly, 
regarding innovation activity, the centralization persists: 50 percent of the Chilean 
researchers work at the capital and 60 percent of the FONDECYT, FONDEF and 
Technological Development National Fund (FONTEC) budgets have been allocated to 
projects presented in the Metropolitan Region during the 1990s (Academia Chilena de 
Ciencias, 2006). In addition, despite the successful examples of the fruit, salmon and 
wine industries (Giulani, 2004), the concept of technological cluster have not reach its 
maximum potential (World Bank, 2003). In the emergence of the Chilean clusters already 
                                                
25 Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas, Chile, www.ine.cl
26 Statistics Finland, www.stat.fi
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mentioned, there was an active participation of public agents, and technology transfer 
institutions such as Fundacion Chile as support organizations. However, before both the 
CORFO’s initiative of the upper 1990s and CONICYT’s regional knowledge programs 
launched in 2001, Chile has not promoted or implemented a steady regional knowledge 
generation policy such as Finland did which would lead to a more homogenous 
development through the emergence of development poles along the country.
3.4.2 Hypothesis 2
In order to analyze Hypothesis 2, it is worth to bring up De Gregorio and Bravo-
Ortega (2005) who point out that economies with rich endowments of human capital and 
close linkages between natural resources and industrial activities can formalize “the idea 
of the joint development of an industrial or high-technology sector simultaneously with 
natural resources”. They highlight the case of the forestry industry in Scandinavia where 
the development of natural resources was accompanied by the growth of an industrial 
base linked to the forestry sector. So, one way to offset any possible negative effect 
coming from a natural resources dependency may be the emergence of new technology-
based industries whose emergence would be conditioned by both having high-skill 
manpower and high rate of R&D investment. Such phenomenon would afford not only a 
reinforcement of natural resource industries but also the establishment of new industries 
which may lead in the long term to significant modifications of the current productive 
structure. According to Dahlman et al (2005), the diversification of export portfolio has 
been mandatory to the improvement of Finnish economy stemming from a steady 
promotion of higher education, linkages and spillovers among industries, and the spawn 
and spread of new knowledge-based industries. Dahlman et al (2005) traced back into 
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Finnish knowledge-based economy evolution by establishing its roots into user-producer 
linkages between forestry-based firms as user of high technology, and the emerging 
engineering, electronic and ICT industries in the 1960s. They analyzed the economic 
development of Finland by breaking it down in three chronological phases and by 
identifying their major features regarding technology-behavior and product-type (see 
Figure 14). Chile’s case is different. The consolidation of Chilean natural resources 
industries has not been accompanied by the emergence of knowledge-based industries 
capable to supply them with intermediate or input products. The human capital richness 
and high R&D budget conditions are not fulfilled in the Chilean case, therefore natural 
resources-based industries are still constraint to low added-value products. Such situation 
contrasts drastically with Finland’s industrial evolution where natural resources based 
industry were not only complemented by high tech industry but also were part of the 
market forces pushing for the latter’s spawn and boom.
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Mid 1800s to Early 1900s
Figure 14 Finland’s Stages Industrial-Economic Development
Source: Dahlman et al (2005)
Backing to Equation [2] results, an increase of 1 percentual point in the share of 
natural resources exports in total exports has increased by 1.07 percent Finland’s income 
per capita. The Finland’s higher and positive return to NRA is justified by its high R&D 
and education performances. As Finland opened its economy during the Post WWII 
period, its exports started to be subject to higher quality standard requirement. The 
challenge was addressed promoting technology creation and diffusion at the production 
level. In addition, by means of delivering better educational training, Finland’s workforce 
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economy. Finland’s natural resources endowment has not been a barrier to development; 
quite the contrary, it has been an important catalyst, not only regarding its own activity, 
but also pushing the emergence of new high-tech sectors. In the case of Chile, an increase 
of 1 percentual point in the share of natural resources exports in total exports has 
decreased by 3.70 percent Chile’s income per capita. Therefore, Chile’s return to NRA is 
not only smaller than Finland’s but also negative. As I mentioned before, having low 
human capital performances and a low innovation capacity has deterred Chile from 
jumping into the knowledge economy postponing a high-tech industry spread. The strong 
natural resources dependency has not been left behind, and its consolidation has not been 
accompanied by the establishment of “lateral” industries able to supply them with high-
tech inputs. Therefore, for Chile’s case NRA has had a negative effect on economic 
growth but it has to be mentioned that NRA has not put Chile away of a steady growth 
path particularly during the last two decades.
Analyzing the interaction term coefficient gives us interesting insights on the 
evolution between R&D and NRA. Return to NRA has increased with R&D by 4.5 
percent and has decreased by 1.8 percent in Chile and Finland respectively. The fact that 
Chile’s coefficient is greater than Finland’s may be contradicting the previous analysis on 
NRA effect on development. However, the explanation may be on the differing R&D 
capacity. As Chile R&D capacity is low and its dependency on natural resources high, an 
increase on R&D investment decreases the negative NRA influence, or in other words the 
returns to NRA rise with R&D. R&D offsets the NRA’s negative effect on economic 
growth. Those results are in accordance with those of Lederman and Maloney (2002), 
and De Gregorio and Bravo Ortega (2005). The same effect is not only smaller on 
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Finland, but even negative. The negative performance on the interaction term means that 
as NRA increases the positive return to R&D decreases. The explanation may be on the 
high R&D capacity and on the lower NRA dependency. Finland’s economy is nowadays 
moving towards a much higher high-tech exports share becoming a much more 
knowledge-intensive economy. Such process has afforded a much higher economic 
productivity and a much higher R&D concentration on high-tech industry27. So, as NRA-
dependency has been left behind, turning back to it would decrease the return to R&D 
since the economy would have been more concentrated in other areas with much higher 
R&D return. Summing up, the pattern of the R&D and development relationship may be 
partly replicate with R&D and NRA: a dollar invested in R&D in a NRA-country closer 
to the technological frontier would have a smaller effect than in NRA-countries with low 
innovative capacity on decreasing the plausible NRA negative effect on economic growth 
since innovating countries must invent the new technologies that push the frontier 
forward. On the other hand, NRA-countries with low R&D capacity would be able to 
decrease the NRA negative effect by catching up to the technological frontier.
                                                




NRA has not been a barrier to Finland’s economic development, and has not 
deterred Chile from a successful growth path during the last decades. However, Finland’s 
better economical performance lays on a different base that Chile’s. At the mid-twentieth 
century, Finland opened its economy leading to a request for high standard products. 
Addressing such demand, Finland reformulated its development strategy affording a 
significant change in its productive structure by boosting an new high tech industry. On 
the other hand, Chile has laid its growth over two main pillars: trade liberalization and an 
economic and institutional regime characterized by the strength and transparency of its 
public institutions. However, Chile has not been able of modifying its productive 
structure as Finland did, remaining as a low-added-value-good producer.
From my analysis, that the return to R&D is higher in Chile than Finland. An 
increase of 1 percentual point on R&D investment has increased by 29 and 27 percent 
income per capita in Chile and Finland respectively. Chile’s better performance has to be 
analyzed taking into account that countries far from the technological frontier reap 
greater benefit from each dollar invested in R&D than those closer to it. Therefore, 
Chile’s R&D coefficient higher value is not an indicator of Chile overcoming Finland but 
of the latter’s wealthy and particularly higher innovative capacity.  I argue that the 
reasons behind such diverging performance lay on the base of Finland S&T reform. The 
answer is not just related to the increase of S&T expenditures at the national level, but to 
a set of other factors. Human capital endowment, strong public institutions and 
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leadership, S&T-promoting public policies and the establishment of technological cluster 
at the regional level have contributed to shape an environment able to supply the right 
incentives in order to promote technological investment not only at the public but also at 
the private level. However, it is worth to note that such environment did not emerge at the 
post-recession time at the early 1990s. It was the final result of a dynamic process started 
decades ago with the genesis of the current human capital endowment and the setting of a 
group of public institutions. Besides, Finland has adopted as its own both the National 
Innovation System and the OECD-Knowledge Based Society approaches which has led it 
to assume a innovation systemic and synergic profile
With regard to natural resources, I explained the higher Finnish return to NRA 
in light of the historical development of the Finland’s natural resources industry. Finnish 
NRA firms were not devoted exclusively to natural resources exploitation and the 
subsequent production of low value-added goods. They aim to produce their own inputs 
in order to lower their production costs. However such phenomenon is based on an 
underlying synergy not replicated in the Chilean case. Finland since the nineteenth 
century was a country with a rich human capital endowment so that high skill workers 
were available to immerse themselves in the creation and the adoption of new 
technologies. In addition, the Finland’s historical economic openness afforded the 
introduction of higher level of market competence and the acquaintance of new 
technological development. On the other hand, Chile presents a better performance than 
Finland on how R&D and NRA have complemented each other. Chile’s return to R&D 
rises with NRA, since NRA industries are Chile’s most important economical activities, 
whereas Finland’s decreases as NRA is not the main local economical activity. In 
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addition, I suggest that return to R&D and development negative correlationship may be 
replicated on return to R&D and NRA just limiting the analysis to NRA countries. The 
richer and more innovative the country, the less the return to R&D rises with NRA. I 
would apply the same rational than the return to R&D and development analysis: an 
R&D investment has a lower return in wealthier and innovating country than in LDCs 
since the former are closer to the technological frontier therefore they are the main pusher 
of it, whereas LDCs reap benefits just catching up to the frontier. Regarding the 
relationship of NRA and R&D I propose as a future research area comparing the 
evolution of a specific natural resources industry in both countries. Such analysis should 
be concentrated on innovation issues, being a good instance the case of the Forestry 
Industry, since both Chile and Finland have strong local forestry developments.
In order to contribute to the current discussion I bring up some proposals in 
terms of Chilean S&T development regarding some Finland’s lessons. Firstly, to increase
the quality and access of the national education system and to promote science and 
engineer careers. Chile has increased its rates of primary, secondary and tertiary 
education but such success has not been accompanied by the supply of high quality 
education yet. Low income families have just access to public education whose quality 
level is significantly lower than private education. In addition, whereas Finland 
implemented a regional network of technology-oriented universities, new Chilean 
universities are mostly concentrated on graduating social science professionals, 
postponing science and engineering careers in light of their high costs. S&T teaching 
(specially at the graduate level) and research activities have to be promoted among the 
new network of private universities. Furthermore, the low share of polytechnic-graduated 
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professionals in Chilean labor market contrasts sharply with their high supply and 
demand in Finland. Such supply constraint of S&T professionals damages not only the 
number of researchers in academia but also in industry. The low number of S&T 
graduates working in industry is a serious risk for Chilean innovation performance since 
it may limit not only the development of new either product or process but the definition 
of future business area. Second, to modify the current institutionalization ruling the 
Chilean S&T system by building a centralized and participative S&T government able to 
define the major strategic Chile’s S&T research areas. Nowadays, Chilean agencies 
involved in S&T management are not ruled by a common national authority contrasting 
with the Finnish S&T system governed by STPC since the 1960s. A coordinated work of 
the S&T Chilean agencies may bring up a better productivity of the S&T system since 
innovation may be generated using a systemic approach in which public-private 
partnership would be the main support. Such process should start by settling a National 
Council of Science and Technology with equal participations of public, private and 
academic actors supporting the generation of knowledge aimed to increase national 
competitiveness. Third, to promote regional innovation cluster looking for an S&T 
homogenous national development. The Finnish example shows how the impact of 
decentralization policies may be upon economic development. A network of technology-
oriented universities strengthened with several promoting-development-oriented regional 
organizations settled by the national government has generated income levels higher than 
the national average. In the case of Chile, EEDC or CEP-institutions-type has to be 
promoted in order to link the R&D university activities with the market demand at the 
regional level. Through such kind of organizations, scientists just concentrated on the 
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S&T development but working in previously defined increasing-competitiveness research 
areas.
In conclusion, Finland’s success is explained by the conjunction and steady 
upgrade of several factors: institutionalization, learning capacity and decentralization. 
Chile is bridging the gap nowadays, launching several public-funded initiatives aimed to 
increase public S&T expenditures, promote private S&T investment, the establishment of 
technological clusters, and the improvement and increase of human capital stock. 
Furthermore, a major discussion regarding S&T public governance is occurring in Chile 
which has led to the proposition of a new institutional framework. In general, despite the 
cross-country differences, Chile is following today a relatively similar path that Finland 
started decades ago, and as Chile’s Minister of Economy has pointed out “…Chile has 
already consolidated trade liberalization, where competitiveness is essential…”.28
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1996 Constant Price
-Labor growth rate (Laborgrowth): International Organization of Labor, LABORISTA 
dataset.
-The share of R&D expenditure in GDP (R&D/GDP):
Chile: CONICYT dataset
Finland: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators
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Natural Resources Exports
Exports of Fuel: Comprise commodities in SITC Revision 1, Section 3 (mineral fuels and 
lubricants and related materials).
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0,1,2,4 and 68 (food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, inedible crude material, 







Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
         Ho: Constant variance
         Variables: fitted values of loggdppc
         chi2(1)      =     1.12
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2903
Chi2(1) at 5 percent confidence level=3.84
1.12<3.84
Ho is rejected, then heteroskedasticity
-Finland
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
         Ho: Constant variance
         Variables: fitted values of loggdppc
         chi2(1)      =     0.05
         Prob > chi2  =   0.8233
Chi2(1) at 5 percent confidence level=3.84
0.05<3.84
Ho is rejected, then heteroskedasticity
a.2 Multicollinearity
-Chile
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF  
-------------+----------------------
      invgdp |      2.48    0.403193
 laborgrowth |      2.07    0.482044
   rdgdplag5 |      1.58    0.631430
-------------+----------------------
    Mean VIF |      2.05
Mean VIF=2.05
2.05<6, then No multicollinearity
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-Finland
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF  
-------------+----------------------
   rdgdplag5 |      1.88    0.532190
      invgdp |      1.88    0.533037
 laborgrowth |      1.02    0.976568
-------------+----------------------
    Mean VIF |      1.59
Mean VIF=1.59




Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
         Ho: Constant variance
         Variables: fitted values of loggdppc
         chi2(1)      =     1.14
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2858
Chi2(1) at 5 percent confidence level=3.84
1.14<3.84
Ho is rejected, then heteroskedasticity
-Finland
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
         Ho: Constant variance
         Variables: fitted values of loggdppc
         chi2(1)      =     0.00
         Prob > chi2  =   0.9486
Chi2(1) at 5 percent confidence level=3.84
0.00<3.84




    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF  
-------------+----------------------
         nr1 |      7.13    0.140258
 laborgrowth |      3.61    0.276876
      invgdp |      3.29    0.304330
   rdgdplag5 |      2.11    0.473392
-------------+----------------------
    Mean VIF |      4.03
Mean VIF=2.05
4.03<6, then No multicollinearity
-Finland
   Variable |       VIF       1/VIF  
-------------+----------------------
   rdgdplag5 |     10.18    0.098210
         nr1 |      7.36    0.135793
      invgdp |      2.34    0.427379
 laborgrowth |      1.13    0.888849
-------------+----------------------
    Mean VIF |      5.25
Mean VIF=2.05
5.25<6, then No multicollinearity
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